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Abstract 
 
This paper addresses the design of the machinery of collective bargaining from the perspective 
of microeconomic and macroeconomic flexibility. In the former context, somewhat greater 
attention is given over to enterprise flexibility than external adjustment. In the latter context, 
close attention is also paid to changes in collective bargaining along the dimensions of 
bargaining coverage, structure, and coordination. Support is adduced for the German, 
contemporary Scandinavian, and British models. The role of trust in securing micro and macro 
flexibility also receives attention, suggesting that the polder or Dutch model might also be 
expected to populate the firmament of fit-for-purpose collective bargaining arrangements. 
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“The remarkable transformation of the German economy from the ‘sick man of Europe’ to a lean and 
highly competitive economy within little more than a decade is rooted in the inherent flexibility of the 
German system of industrial relations. This system allowed German industry to react appropriately and 
flexibly over time to the demands of German unification, and the global challenges of a new world 
economy.” (Dustmann et al. 2014: 183) 
“The only realistic aim is to influence labor market outcomes, not to rationalize labor market processes 
which will continue to display enormous diversity, fragmentation and incoherence.” (Teague and Grahl 
1998: 18) 
 
1 Introduction 
This paper charts changing views on a labor market institution from the perspective of 
microeconomic and macroeconomic flexibility. The particular labor market institution examined 
here is collective bargaining – other labor market institutions will be mentioned only in passing. 
And in discussing microeconomic flexibility and reallocation needs we will be rather more 
concerned with enterprise flexibility than with considerations of external adjustment. Our 
discussion of macroeconomic flexibility centers familiarly on the ability of the economy to 
maintain a low average unemployment rate and to limit fluctuations in the unemployment rate in 
response to shocks under different collective bargaining regimes.  
In discussing micro flexibility, evidence that unionism is associated with wage rigidity 
constraining labor market reallocation has to be considered in the context of bargaining level as 
well as alongside the apparent stimulus given to adjustments along other margins. Further, the 
importance of internal labor markets under both union and non-union regimes redirects our 
attention to enterprise flexibility. Theoretical developments in the areas of collective voice and 
contract theory that focus on internal labor market structuring have offered support for pro-
productive union effects. If the promise of unions in this regard remains unfulfilled for the United 
States, this evidence cannot be uncritically applied to other nations. In particular, some of the 
more promising performance results are reported for the German dual system of sectoral 
bargaining in combination with workplace codetermination.  
Work on macro flexibility was if anything to portray unionism and collective bargaining in 
more positive light once research moved beyond a focus on union density/coverage and the 
simple exertion of market power. But the performance of models based on corporatism, 
modified notions of centralization (most notably the hump-shape thesis), and even coordination 
faded through time. That is, institutions did not affect macro outcomes consistently. Moreover, 
important changes in collective bargaining beginning in the 1990s in the form of decentralization 
were not reflected in the stylized institutions.  
However, Visser’s (2013, 2016) updated discussion of national collective bargaining 
institutions provides a comprehensive breakdown of changes in collective bargaining along the 
dimensions of bargaining coverage, bargaining structure, and bargaining coordination. His 
discussion is summarized in the present treatment and certain key themes uncovered there 
enlarged upon. These include extension agreements, orientation, and above all 
decentralization. Visser’s taxonomy pays especial attention to decentralization while addressing 
diversity of practice within bargaining categories. In conjunction with other pieces of evidence, it 
helps us establish the protean shape of emerging (i.e. decentralized) collective bargaining 
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systems that may be fit-for-purpose in the sense of meeting the requirements of micro and 
macro flexibility. Supportive case study material drawn from studies of innovative practices 
associated with decentralization is provided.  
Specific support for the German model and the modified Scandinavian model is qualified 
by very recent theoretical work pointing to the superiority of fully decentralized collective 
bargaining systems also reviewed here. It is argued that these models of firm-level bargaining 
are not inconsistent with the German and Scandinavian sectoral models. By the same token, 
one has to recognize that these theoretical developments more directly make a case for the 
Anglo-Saxon model, albeit one probably differentiated from the two other models by its greater 
reliance on managerial control. This is a not unimportant conclusion, and is consistent with 
Freeman’s (1998: 15) evocative “more than one road to Rome” remark. 
It has long been argued that trust may be just as important in securing macro (and 
micro) flexibility as the structure of collective bargaining itself. In tackling the neglected issue of 
trust, its association with unemployment is examined together with some supplementary 
research findings on the relation between trust and the design and the quantity of labor market 
legislation. In addition, the intriguing notion that the very scale of the changes in wage-setting 
institutions in recent years may have served to erode trust is addressed. Social pacts are also 
considered since they may either be viewed as requiring trust or as substituting for it. In 
discussing the polder model 1982-2000, it becomes clear that there are also features of the 
collective bargaining system that potentially help build trust. For this reason, our series of fit-for-
purpose collective bargaining models may be expanded to include the contemporary Dutch 
system.   
The last major theme examined in this report is the vexed question of earnings 
dispersion, analysis of which has gained more currency of late because of the association 
between inequality and growth. Information on this association is reviewed before turning to 
union decline and inequality. Two basic views of unions and inequality are offered. The first is 
the standard one: unions are associated with reduced inequality, the corollary being that their 
decline has exacerbated it. The second is associated with the recherché notion that unions have 
in fact become less interested in redistribution. Even if one accepts that union decline is an 
important determinant of rising inequality, however, there is no general presumption in favor of 
strengthening the institution. The growth card is complicated precisely because losses of 
competitiveness may have caused union decline. 
However, to take up a separate issue, and one remitted to our concluding section, might 
not the case for offering support to unionism be stiffened by the likelihood of a shortfall in worker 
voice in the wake of union decline? At face value this case is rather more convincing, and 
mandates favoring (some form of) worker representation may be indicated. That said, the 
evidence, while not unequivocal, points to a dramatic expansion of British non-union voice in the 
wake of union decline in that nation as well as the active suggestion that management has had 
an incentive to invest in non-union voice.  
It is important to recognize that the present treatment is a partial one. It reflects the very 
real state of flux in the institutions of collective bargaining that awaits formal incorporation into 
models of the covariation of labor market institutions and macro outcomes. Further, at the more 
detailed micro level, it reflects in part the tendency of research to focus on Anglo-Saxon nations 
and a few key continental European nations and also in part the research preoccupations of the 
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author. As a result, some nations will be mentioned only in passing and others largely ignored. 
The limitations of this explorative analysis have therefore to be stated at the outset and borne in 
mind throughout. The goal is to establish key associations and the most important trends in a 
framework that seeks to identify a plurality of fit-for-purpose regimes rather than favoring any 
single model. 
2 Microeconomic issues 
In this first substantive section of the paper, we consider the issue of micro flexibility and 
collective bargaining. Based on recent studies of firm survey data, our discussion begins with 
the process of adjustment at firm level in respect of price, wage, and employment responses to 
shocks, wage rigidities and non-wage labor costs flexibility, the frequency and manner of wage 
and price changes, as well as the way in which the wages of newly hired workers are linked to 
market conditions and to the wages of existing employees. The associations uncovered here 
also have a direct bearing on macro adjustment. And while the backdrop is the constraints 
imposed by collective bargaining on firm-level reactions, flexibility and diversity are also in 
evidence. The question of enterprise flexibility is taken up in the second part of the section, 
where we discuss union impact on enterprise performance more generally. This broader focus 
allows us to introduce some key themes taken up in this review on the suitability of different 
collective bargaining regimes. That is, our examination of individual country-level studies goes 
part of the way to establishing the components of workable models of collective bargaining while 
raising the issue of trust.  
Some recent micro evidence on price and wage flexibility and 
collective bargaining 
A recent group of articles have exploited data from the Wage Dynamics Network, a novel firm-
level survey sponsored by a consortium of central banks in the EU and coordinated by the 
European Central Bank, containing qualitative information on various firm adjustment 
mechanisms, to address micro adjustment processes and the role of rigidities. The survey was 
conducted in 2007/2008 in 17 EU countries and covered some 17,000 firms. As we shall see in 
section 3, it has also been used by Boeri (2014; 2015) in support of his criticism of two-tier 
bargaining regimes – arrangements in which plant-level wage negotiations supplement industry-
level bargaining – as failing to improve either microeconomic or macroeconomic adjustment to 
shocks.  
An important study by Bertola et al. (2012) focuses on firms’ reactions to hypothetical 
cost-push shocks: either an unanticipated increase in the cost of an intermediate input, or an 
unanticipated permanent increase in wages. The four possible responses were (a) an increase 
in prices, (b) a reduction in profit margins, (c) a reduction in output, and (d) a reduction in costs. 
The ‘relevance’ or importance of each reaction was also taken into account. The authors’ probit 
regressions indicate that firms facing product market competition, or exporting much of their 
output, are less likely to increase prices and more likely to reduce costs after a wage shock 
assumed common to all firms in the industry. Further, the presence of collective agreements at 
industry or national level (but not at firm level) makes a price increase more likely. On the 
separate question of reducing costs after a cost or wage shock (having identified six such 
strategies: reduce number of temporary/other employees, reduce number of permanent 
employees, reduce hours worked per employee, reduce flexible wage components, reduce base 
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wages, and reduce non-labor costs), Bertola et al. report that firms operating in a highly 
competitive product market environment were less likely to reduce non-labor costs and more 
likely to reduce labor costs. This wage reduction route was less likely in situations in which firms 
are subject to labor contracts signed at levels higher than the firm. Cost reductions in these 
circumstances were secured by cutting employment, and in particular temporary employment. 
Finally, it is speculated that completion of the single market and monetary union by stimulating 
product market competition and promoting deregulation may have helped foster macroeconomic 
stability, creating a favorable milieu for a rule-based, credible policy regime. 
A second study by Druant et al. (2012) examines the frequency and character of wage 
and price increases and their interrelation. (Recall that the degree of wage and price rigidity 
determines the speed of adjustment of the economy to macroeconomic shocks and with it the 
scale of the adjustment costs.) The authors’ examination of the speed with which firms change 
prices and wages indicates that the frequency of the latter is roughly one-half that of the former 
– although both ‘series’ display considerable time dependence. The overall stickiness of wages 
thus exceeds that of prices. The frequency of wage adjustment evinces lower dispersion across 
sectors, and higher dispersion across countries, than does the frequency of price adjustment. 
Coupled with widespread wage indexation, the implication of price and wage rigidity is real 
wage rigidity, which makes the adjustment of the economy to aggregate shocks more costly. 
The authors’ cet. par. analysis of price and wage rigidity at firm level indicates that prices are 
more flexible where competitive pressures in product markets are strong and where labor costs 
account for a smaller fraction of total costs. Wages are more flexible where bargaining is 
decentralized (being conducted at firm level as opposed to national/sectoral/regional level) and 
where the coverage of collective bargaining and the stringency of employment protection 
legislation are low. Finally, descriptive  evidence is provided (e.g. on the comparable frequency 
of wage and price changes and the synchronization between the timing of wage and price 
changes) showing that wages and prices feed into each other at firm level and that wage and 
price rigidity are interrelated especially in labor intensive sectors. 
Babecḱy et al. (2012) investigate nominal wage rigidity and labor cost adjustment 
practices, exploiting questions in the WDN inquiring about instances of freezes in the base 
wage and the use of (six) other policies to cut labor costs. They find that firms subject to wage 
rigidity have an increased likelihood of using other margins across the board. Changes in 
bonuses and non-wage benefits are two such margins of adjustment. Focusing on the results 
for unionization, where the key variables are the percentage of workers covered by collective 
agreements and the structure of bargaining (individual negotiations with workers, firm-level 
agreements with unions, sectoral/national agreements, and both firm-level and national/sectoral 
bargaining), the main findings are twofold. First, union presence is associated with more 
intensive use of most margins, even after the effect of nominal wage rigidity is taken into 
account (which therefore appears to be capturing constraints not explained by unionism), so 
that although unions may constrain wage flexibility in ways not uncovered by the survey they 
may well facilitate the use of alternative labor cost cutting strategies. Second, firm-level 
collective bargaining is associated with greater use of external adjustment as a means of 
lowering labor costs (viz. hiring new employees at lower wages and encouraging early 
retirement). The authors’ speculate that this might indicate that local agreements place greater 
emphasis on insiders’ interests. 
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The final study in the series examines differences in wage setting between newly hired 
and incumbent workers. Galuscak et al. (2012) report findings as to the relative importance of 
internal versus external factors in the setting of wages for newly-hired workers. In general, the 
former are found to be more important influences than the latter. The internal factors are the 
importance of the wages of similar employees in the firm and the ruling collective agreement 
(irrespective of its ‘level’) and external factors comprise the importance of the availability of 
workers with similar characteristics outside the firm and the wages of workers with similar 
characteristics outside the firm. (The relevance of the question is that it has a bearing on the 
debate over the cyclicality of the wages of new hires and in particular whether these are more 
flexible/respond more strongly to changes in unemployment and productivity than do the wages 
of incumbent workers.) Galuscak et al. also report that internal pay structures are even more 
binding when there is labor market slack. The bias in favor of internal factors has a basis in 
considerations of fairness and the need to prevent a negative impact on effort. This general 
result is mediated by cross-country and within-country differences. The authors’ pooled cross 
country probit estimates of the probability that external factors dominate in determining pay 
point to positive associations in the cases of employee turnover, employee skill level, and the 
degree of product market competition. On the other hand, firms with high collective agreement 
coverage have a substantially lower probability of reporting external factors as the main 
determinant of hiring pay.1  
Although this evidence on adjustment processes points to greater wage inflexibility 
under collective bargaining, and higher-level bargaining in particular, the studies also suggest 
that unionism may nonetheless facilitate flexibility along other margins of adjustment. (Positive 
aspects of avoiding repeated recontracting will be noted below.) Lacunae of the WDN include its 
cross-sectional nature, basis in subjective responses, and effective omission of Germany, inter 
al., from the sample. 
Micro flexibility more broadly 
It is conventional to discuss micro flexibility in terms of labor allocation, to include movements of 
workers between jobs, industrial sectors, and geographic regions. Much attention has been 
given over to the impact of institutions other than unions and in particular unemployment 
insurance and employment protection legislation because of their pivotal role in reallocation and 
unemployment (see, respectively, OECD 2006; OECD 2010; Bassanini 2011). While noting that 
there has been altogether less research on the effects of labor market regimes on reallocation, 
unemployment incidence, and unemployment duration, Blanchard et al. (2013) identify three 
such regimes according to the combination of measures deployed. At the price of some 
imprecision, as these authors indeed note, the regimes are (a) the low employment 
protection/low unemployment insurance mix offered by the Anglo-Saxon model, (b) the medium-
to-high employment protection/generous albeit qualified unemployment insurance/active labor 
market policy combination of the Nordic model, and (c) the high employment 
protection/generous unemployment insurance/but limited active labor market policies of the 
Continental model. Regime (a) is characterized by large labor flows, short jobless duration, and 
low unemployment, and regime (b) by significant reallocation but low unemployment. Blanchard 
et al. accept that this depiction of labor market regimes is something of a caricature, and is 
incomplete in not addressing the (critical) contribution of collective bargaining structures to 
flexibility. Partly for this reason, they eschew identifying countries making up model (c), which is 
labeled a failure in view of its limited reallocation and higher unemployment, although they do 
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exonerate Germany by virtue of the Hartz legislative reforms. The goal of the exercise is to 
identify regimes that promote micro flexibility, the influence of collective bargaining structures 
being seen as having more to do with macro flexibility. 
Blanchard et al. observe that flexibility achieved through (the Nordic model of) flexicurity 
– namely a system that seeks to reconcile the managerial prerogative to hire and fire with the 
workers' need for security or, more bluntly, the protection of workers not jobs – may be 
especially attractive in view of its comparative distributional implications. However, even if 
widely regarded as the direction to go to reform labor market institutions, it is cautioned that the 
features of the Nordic model may not replicable in practice. Specifically it is argued that the 
success of flexicurity may in turn reflect the degree of trust between firms and workers and 
between citizens and their governments.  
The above typology differs from the more detailed classification adopted in the present 
treatment. But this prior, more broadly based distinction between labor market regimes is 
pertinent for a number of reasons. In the first place, it recognizes different concepts of flexibility. 
Next, it directs our attention to the interplay between institutions. Finally, it elevates the 
importance of trust between workers and firms and their workers, and citizens and their 
government. Trust is a variable that affects both micro and macro analysis of institutional design 
and performance, and it will figure prominently in our developing discussion. 
In section 3 we will return to examine macro flexibility as reflected in the ability of the 
economy to maintain low employment (inter al.) in the face of macroeconomic shocks. For the 
present, however, we continue with micro flexibility issues, and will accord within enterprise 
flexibility and adjustment more emphasis. To set the scene, let us begin with the conventional 
monopoly theory of unions. This sees their effects as unequivocally negative. Viewed as 
combinations in restraint of trade, unions introduce distortions into what would otherwise be 
efficient labor markets. They distort labor market outcomes due to the increase in compensation 
above competitive levels and impose deadweight losses (i.e. with greater than optimal 
employment/output in the non-union sector and too little employment/output in the union sector). 
This misallocation of resources is not nullified by any subsequent hiring of higher-quality labor 
by unionized employers, even if that is in fact what occurs (see Hirsch 2004b: 422). To these 
losses in welfare, it is conventional to add the output costs stemming from the union rule-book 
and reduced management discretion. That said, it is less common today to further add in 
putative output losses from strikes, either on the grounds that these can in practice be averted 
by (inter-temporal or inter-firm) substitution, or because of the now widespread acceptance of 
the notion that strikes are in a sense accidents, strike-threat power being manifested in the 
wage premium rather than stoppages.   
But there is a countervailing view of unions that emphasizes their value-enhancing 
effects. The chief exponents of this collective voice model of unionism are Freeman and Medoff 
(1984), whose focus is upon the operation of internal labor markets. Freeman and Medoff note 
the ambiguity introduced by long-term attachments between the firm and much of its labor force 
for the efficiency properties of the standard quit or exit mechanism. The firm’s reliance on quits 
to extract information relevant to the design of an efficient mix of wages and working conditions 
may introduce inefficiencies by focusing on the preferences of the marginal worker rather than 
those of older, more stable, and potentially more valuable employees. (There are also mobility 
costs on the other side of the market.) As a result, voice or direct communication between the 
worker and the firm fulfils the role of bringing actual and desired conditions closer together.  
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Crucial to this argument is that many working conditions are public goods in the sense 
that their consumption is nonrival, such that exclusion from their consumption is either difficult or 
impossible (examples include safety conditions and line speeds). Without some form of 
collective agency – which the authors at all times equate with autonomous unions – the worker’s 
incentive to express his or her preferences would be too small. Another public goods aspect of 
the workplace arises from complementarities in production. In such circumstances, the attitudes 
and morale of the worker become potentially important inputs into the production process. On 
the same reasoning as employed earlier, collective organization may increase output through a 
joint determination of effort inputs; perhaps more so through increased cooperation between 
workers in continuity markets. We note parenthetically that for the public goods argument to 
have force, and as Freeman (1976) notes, two further conditions have to be met. First, there 
must be costs to using the regular market because if quitting were costless the individual worker 
could simply choose the employer whose working conditions most closely approximated his or 
her preferences. Second, the workplace has to be buffeted by unforeseen shocks that change 
its nature in an informational context; otherwise there would be no need for the union’s demand-
revealing function after the formative match. Note, also, that a distortion of the separation 
decision – a firing tax – is also central to the choice by workers and firms for collective over 
individualized wage setting in Boeri and Burda’s (2009) model of endogenous collective 
bargaining. 
Thus, there are a number of largely informational channels through which unionism as 
the instrument of collective voice can improve the operation of the workplace.2 Their most 
tangible manifestation is the reduction in quits – holding wages constant – attendant upon the 
substitution of voice for exit. Hiring and training costs are thereby reduced and investments in 
specific capital increase in relation to general investments, facilitated by seniority systems.  
But there is also the important issue of governance. Here the analysis of Freeman and 
Medoff is consistent with modern contract theory, wherein governance refers to the policing 
and/or monitoring of incomplete employment contracts. Unions might facilitate long-term 
efficient contracting in a number of ways. A union specializing in information about the contract, 
and in the representation of workers, can help make credible (truthful) employer claims about 
the onset of adverse states of nature that might otherwise be discounted by the workforce to the 
detriment of the joint surplus of the enterprise. Again, workers may withhold effort and 
cooperation when the employer cannot credibly commit to take their interests into account. In 
certain circumstances, the union may even be construed as an agent of the employer in policing 
worker effort, or indeed of the shareholder principal in reducing agency problems stemming 
from the divorce of ownership and control in the modern corporation.  
Recognition of transaction costs opens up a number of possibilities for positive union 
effects at the firm level, including those stemming from potential ‘hold-up’ on the part of the 
employer. We note that some such contract theoretic issues are addressed in the 
institutionalized corporatist model of Teulings and Hartog (1998), who argue that corporatism 
achieves allocative efficiency through the establishment of ex ante nominal binding contracts 
that obviate the need for inefficient ex post negotiation or recontracting (see the macro flexibility 
discussion below). Nevertheless, there are many uncertainties and lingering ambiguities in all of 
this. A key problem arises from the threat of union punishment deemed necessary to make 
credible an employer’s ex ante promises, and the wider implications of the exertion of this 
bargaining power. What, then, of bargaining power in the Freeman-Medoff model? As a 
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practical matter, unions are seen as having two faces – a monopoly face and a collective voice 
face – so that the net effect is always an empirical question. Indeed, collective voice in this 
particular model has very little traction unless it leads to a positive managerial response.  
What, then, does the evidence on unions and firm performance/enterprise flexibility 
suggest? Were we to focus on the U.S. evidence alone, the modern view of unionism would not 
fare too well. First, as far as the keynote productivity variable is concerned, union effects are 
small and to all intents and purposes close to zero on average (see Addison and Hirsch 1989; 
Hirsch 2004b). Second, productivity growth appears lower in union regimes, although this 
particular result seems to be the consequence of union firms being located in slower growing 
sectors (Hirsch 1991). Third, if neither result points to negative direct effects of unions, findings 
with respect to profitability are of greater concern. In one sense a negative profitability effect is 
to be expected given the size of the union premium (see below) in conjunction with a close-to-
zero productivity effect. Virtually all U.S. studies point to lower profitability in union regimes 
irrespective of the profit measure used (see Doucouliagos and Laroche 2009). At issue, 
however, is the source of the union gain. For Freeman and Medoff the process is merely a 
redistributive effect with no implications for efficiency. But, as Hirsh (2004b: 433-434) 
documents, there is little to suggest that concentration-related profits are an important source of 
the gain. More potent sources are current earnings associated with limited foreign competition 
and current and future earnings from growing firm/industry demand, inter al.  
Fourth, yet more concern stems from union effects on investments in tangible (i.e. 
investment) and intangible (R&D) capital. Influential research by Hirsch (1991) confirms that 
unions capture some share of the quasi rents that make up the normal returns to investment in 
long-lived capital and R&D.  (This, then, is one component of the union profit effect, discussed 
earlier.) Firms seek to limit their exposure, most obviously by cutting back on these investments. 
There are both direct and indirect union effects: the former are caused by the wage tax while the 
latter stem from the reduction in profits (relevant because of imperfect capital markets).  
Fifth, and as anticipated, lower profits and investment are reflected in lower employment 
growth (e.g. Leonard, 1992) if not seemingly in higher failure rates (e.g. DiNardo and Lee 
2004).3 That being said, firm birth rates may be lower in more highly unionized industries 
(Dunne and Macpherson 1994) while, in extremis, and by way of explanation, substantial wage 
premia may be viewed as offering a source of wage flexibility via contract concessions (Hirsch 
2004b: 438). 
Apart from a union ‘voice’ effect on quits that clearly dominates any wage effect on quits, 
these are rather negative results. Not only do they appear to underpin the precipitous decline in 
U.S. unionism – for example, Hirsch (1991) finds a negative correlation between firm profitability 
in the late 1970s and subsequent changes in union density between 1977 and 1987 – but to 
threaten the very existence of private-sector unions. Before turning to the other-country 
experience, however, some more positive aspects should be cited. First of all, one U.S. study 
examining the effects on labor productivity of various working practices, information technology, 
and management procedures in conjunction with unionism offers a brighter scenario (Black and 
Lynch 2001). Using cross section and panel date on 638 establishments from a nationally 
representative sample of manufacturing establishments, 1987-93, it reports that a hypothetical 
union plant embracing benchmarking and total quality management, with 50 percent of its 
workers meeting on a regular basis (a measure of employee involvement) and operating profit 
sharing for its non-managerial employees, would have 13.5 percent higher productivity than a 
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non-union plant with none of these practices. By contrast the corresponding differential for a 
high-performance non-union plant is put at only 4.5 percent – although if union and non-union 
plants possessed none of these workplace practices, the latter would have 10 percent higher 
productivity than the former. As a matter of fact, however, such innovative union plants 
constituted a tiny share of union workplaces in this study sample. 
Second of all, and relatedly, a set of micro studies have pointed to the importance of 
good industrial relations or trust to measured outcomes, as suggested by the collective-voice 
model and also as reported for the underground bituminous coal industry by Freeman and 
Medoff (1984). Thus, a number of case studies have suggested that firms or plants 
characterized by cooperation, employee involvement, and relatively low grievance rates tend to 
have higher levels of productivity and economic performance (e.g. Katz et al. 1983). More 
recent studies include Kleiner et al.’s (2002) investigation of the impact of the industrial relations 
climate on productivity at a major aircraft assembly plant, 1974-1991, and Krueger and Mas’ 
(2004) careful case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality in a tire plant in the 
mid-1990s. 
Nevertheless, to what extent do the preponderantly negative results for the United 
States carry over to other countries? In the first place, given that the U.S. union wage gap is 
unusually high compared with that in other countries (see Blanchflower and Bryson 2003; 
Bryson 2010; Hirsch 2004a), one might expect the main U.S. results reported above to be in the 
vanguard of adverse effects. This is the broad thrust of the comparative literature, although it is 
sparse and still confined to a comparatively few developed and largely Anglo-Saxon nations 
(see, for example, Aidt and Tzannatos 2002; Metcalf 2003; Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003, 
2009).  
The comparative six-nation study by Metcalf is of especial interest because of the nature 
of its treatment of the United States, Britain, and Germany, as well as high performance work 
practices, and the range of outcomes addressed. While noting the unfavorable productivity 
results for strongly organized British workplaces in 1980, adverse effects of increased union 
density in Canada, and strongly negative productivity outcomes for Australia in respect of both 
union density and coverage, Metcalf offers a more positive diagnosis for the United States and 
Britain. Thus, he emphasizes the Black and Lynch (2001) study reviewed earlier for the United 
States, and reports roughly comparable results obtained in his own research using data from 
the Management Questionnaire of the 1998 British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
and having a basis in partnership agreements. Metcalf offers some detail on the impact of such 
partnerships, using subjective outcome indicators for productivity (and financial performance). 
Partnership is defined as obtaining where the union negotiates pay and management negotiates 
with or consults the union on recruitment, training, payment systems, handling grievances, staff 
planning, equal opportunities, health and safety, and performance appraisals. Metcalf’s probit 
regressions indicate that when a workplace with union recognition also has the hallmark human 
resource management practices its productivity (and financial performance) is much enhanced; 
that is, the probability of above-average levels of and changes in productivity (and financial 
performance) are significantly improved. An HRM workplace with no union has a superior 
productivity and financial performance to a unionized workplace with no HRM, but in this study 
only in the case of productivity growth are the best performing workplaces those with both HRM 
and union recognition. 
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Further in the case of Britain, he emphasizes that what was true for the nation in 1980 
was no longer true thereafter. British (and indeed Australian) productivity shortfalls were largely 
attributed to multi-unionism (i.e. the presence of more than one union in a workplace). Metcalf’s 
review of the German evidence on productivity, and indeed the other performance outcomes, 
largely pertains to works councils rather than unionism per se. Although his portrayal is accurate 
and pays appropriate attention to the dual system of industrial relations in that nation, the 
evidence in question has been overtaken by events in the form of new research using nationally 
representative samples of establishments, and will be addressed below.  
In the case of profitability, the main result is the weaker performance of unionized 
companies. But two aspects of Metcalf’s review stand out. First, he again advances the idea 
that new forms of organizing work and union management relations hold out the promise of 
maximizing shareholder wealth and employee welfare, drawing on the one U.S. financial 
performance study to report positive results (viz. Batt and Welbourne 2002), and in particular its 
rationale that there has been a sea change in contemporary labor and product markets away 
from oligopolistic markets, mass production approaches to work organization, and conflictual 
labor relations. Second, the British evidence reviewed by Metcalf is interesting in suggesting 
that, by the end of the 1990s, there was no longer a negative association between union 
presence and financial performance.4  
Turning to union effects on investment in physical capital, Metcalf notes that the British 
evidence is mixed with the clearest negative effects being reported for 1980-84, namely a period 
largely prior to far reaching industrial relations legislation.5 This shift in the impact of British 
unions in the decade of the 1990s compared to the 1980s has been widely observed in the 
literature. Thus, for example, Addison and Belfield (2004a) chart the changes in the impact of 
British unions at a time when union density almost halved – from 53 per cent in 1979 to 28 per 
cent in 1999. They report clear evidence of a diminution in the effects of unions on wages, 
financial performance, and productivity through time – even if certain unfavorable effects of 
unions are found to persist such as slower employment growth and elevated absenteeism.  
The question on unions and investment returns us to the German research literature. As 
Metcalf correctly anticipated in his survey, this literature on unions and firm performance is in a 
state of flux because of the ongoing decentralization of collective bargaining. But it is also an 
issue of emphasis. Until very recently the research literature focused on either unions or works 
councils – more typically the latter. Yet, as is widely known, German industrial relations conform 
to a dual system, with collective agreements traditionally being negotiated at industry level 
between trade unions and employers associations, while works councils operate at plant level. 
Works councils, though formally independent of unions, oversee the implementation and 
coordination of collective agreements at workplace level, and have important information, 
consultation, and codetermination rights under law. The two institutions need to be considered 
in tandem.  
German works councils are viewed as an exemplary voice institution by (one of) the 
framers of the collective voice model (see Freeman and Lazear 1995), not only because of their 
informational and governance functions but also because of the legal limits placed on their 
authority. That is, they cannot strike and cannot formally engage in bargaining over wages 
unless expressly authorized to do so under the relevant industry level bargaining agreement. So 
one may speak in principle of a decoupling of the factors that determine the size of the joint 
surplus from those that determine its distribution, the latter being the ‘responsibility’ of the union 
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at industry level. Despite the provenance of the institution, however, we do not know whether 
there is a sufficient decoupling in practice given that the authority of the entity implies material 
bargaining power. Theory, therefore, does not provide an unambiguous answer as to the 
efficiency consequences of works councils either. (A trust-based theoretical take on the German 
model is offered in Box A.) A final point is that works council authority in Germany has grown 
under the decentralization of industry-wide collective bargaining. Under opening clauses and 
pacts for competitiveness, unions have provided for greater flexibility within industry-wide 
collective bargaining agreements.  
(Box A near here) 
While it is true that the findings of the German literature reported in Metcalf have been 
superseded by a new literature having a basis in nationally representative data, the issue of 
works council impact remains mixed (see, in particular, Addison 2009: Chapter 6). But there is 
some suggestion that their effect on firm performance (productivity) may be positive in 
circumstances where they are firmly embedded in the dual system and their effect on wages 
altogether less pronounced (Hübler and Jirjahn 2003). Here rent seeking might be confined to 
collective bargaining proper. However, since greater works council involvement is the 
handmaiden of decentralization, more work is required on the new bargaining arrangements 
under opening clauses and pacts for competitiveness. We shall provide evidence on both of 
these contractual innovations in the next section when discussing decentralization of collective 
bargaining. For present purposes, however, we shall focus on investments in intangible capital, 
where many of the standard theoretical arguments carry over from investment in physical 
capital. Again, most of the empirical literature on innovation deals with the U.S. experience, and 
the evidence is no more favorably disposed toward unionism than in the case of investments in 
physical capital (Menezes-Filho and van Reenen 2003). Here, however, the German literature 
subsequent to Metcalf’s review has been altogether more positive. Thus, a recent study by 
Addison et al. (2013), using data from the IAB Establishment Panel for the observation window 
2007-2012, provides encouraging estimates of the effect of collective bargaining on four 
categories (three product and one process) of innovation. Since both collective agreement and 
workplace codetermination status are observed, the modeling strategy is ultimately designed to 
generate estimates of the effect of trade unions and works councils on innovation that are free, 
as far as possible, from the contamination of selection issues associated with endogenous 
decisions regarding the choice of these two institutional entities. Prior to that, controlling for a 
wide set of covariates, the authors’ estimates using pooled data suggest that the conjunction of 
the two institutions is relatively friendly to innovation. Arguments associated with more 
innovation of all types included training at the workplace and competition, but not the profit 
situation. The authors’ subsequent analysis of sectoral agreement and works council transitions 
and their relationship to innovation is conducted within a difference-in-differences framework in 
which establishments leaving/joining a sectoral agreement are compared with those that remain 
covered/uncovered. Taken as a whole, the study provides some weak evidence that collective 
bargaining inhibits innovation but stronger support  for the notion that sectoral bargaining in 
conjunction with works councils – the dual system – offers a favorable milieu for innovative 
activity. 
The distinctive features of the German works council may be the key. Here we note in 
passing that French research is less favorable to the entity. In particular, a study by Fairris and 
Askenazy (2010) fails to detect a positive association between works council presence and firm 
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productivity. Indeed, if anything, the association is negative. Further, although there is no 
indication that the estimated association is influenced by union status on the German pattern, 
worker voice and HPWPs are present in French firms irrespective of works council status and 
yield positive and statistically significant effects on firm productivity throughout. That said, 
international comparisons of works councils mainly take the form of qualitative case studies. In a 
recent departure, however, Van den Berg et al. (2013) offer a cross-country quantitative 
analysis of the effects of workplace representation on firm performance using the European 
Company Survey for 2009. The authors effect a comparison across 25 EU nations aggregated 
in 5 cultural clusters, namely Germanic, Southern European, Anglo-Saxon, Scandinavian, and 
Transition. It is reported that the subjectively defined measure of firm performance (the 
‘economic situation’ of the firm) is adversely affected by councils in the Germanic cluster 
(comprising Germany, Austria, the Netherlands) whereas the contrary obtains for the two-nation 
Anglo-Saxon cluster, comprising Ireland and the United Kingdom, in respect of their voluntary 
information and consultation bodies. Limitations of the study include the focus on economic 
performance rather than (perceived) labor productivity and work climate, the clustering of 
nations given both material and subtle differences in institutional regimes (although for an 
alternative approach that avoids clustering, see Jansen 2014), and the endogeneity of 
workplace representation. These factors coupled with the cross-section nature of the data raise 
serious questions about the robustness of the empirical evidence and may contribute to the 
study’s frankly surprising results. However, given a move towards decentralized bargaining, the 
study’s use of comparative workplace data, is a welcome development, and one that may be 
linked to national collective bargaining systems. 
This returns us to some additional observations on the union-high performance work 
practices nexus, beginning with the issue of the role of HPWPs in enabling union firms 
embracing these transforming industrial relations practices to outcompete not only traditional 
non-union firms but also those non-union firms with the same set of practices. Unfortunately, 
despite the suggestion in the literature that combinations of innovative practices and worker 
representation can yield productivity gains, there should be no pretence to precision in all of this 
in the sense of the literature having uncovered a well-determined hierarchy for productivity 
performance – that is, with unionized plants having innovative practices at the apex – still less a 
blue-print for the future of unions. Vulgo: this conclusion and the use of synthetic workplaces to 
identify hierarchies is frankly premature. For example, a British study by Wood and de Menezes 
(1998) that uses latent variable analysis  to search for identifiable patterns in the use of 23 high 
performance practices, and is able to identify a progression of what it calls high commitment 
management (high HCM, medium-low HCM, low-medium HCM and low HCM), reaches rather 
sobering conclusions. First of all, neither high HCM nor low HCM are distinctive with respect to 
unionism. Second, in examining seven dimensions of firm performance – productivity, changes 
in productivity, financial performance, job creation, employee relations climate, labor turnover, 
and absenteeism – in no case do high HCM plants perform better on any performance criteria 
than all the others, although they do perform better than some types.  
The German evidence concerns the association between works councils and HPWPs 
and is reviewed in Addison (2009: 84-93). In common with other countries, the research has 
focused more on the effect of the practices themselves than with their interaction with workplace 
representation. One key result is that practices that appear to have no positive value emerge (or 
even negative effects) emerge on closer inspection to be pro-productive, while yet others that 
are on the face of it productive are found to have no effect on performance having controlled for 
14 
 
their endogeneity. There is also some strong suggestion that positive payoffs may only be 
realized in companies with works councils, although we cannot discount the possibility that the 
unobserved characteristic of ‘good management’ lies at the heart of the matter. To be sure, 
there are also results, allowing for selection and using panel estimates, pointing to the 
productivity of some types of training and of more training in works council regimes, which 
evidence is consistent with works councils reducing turnover and incentivizing employers to 
provide greater training. However, given the lingering ambiguity as to the costs of the practices 
in question, and profound causality issues attendant upon the unobserved timing of these 
transforming industrial relations practices, the literature cannot yet be said to have uncovered a 
well-determined hierarchy for firm performance.  
Finally, we consider union impact on employment. If there is one constant in the 
literature it is that unions appear to retard employment growth. For Anglo-Saxon countries the 
magnitude of the effect is approximately 3 percent a year (see Addison and Belfield 2004b).  Yet 
in the light of the foregoing discussion, employment growth is a not unambiguous indicator. For 
example, unionized plants shedding restrictive/protective practices (Britain, post-Thatcher?) 
might grow employment less than non-union plants. More positively, the same result might be 
produced by unionized firms adopting new forms of work organization and union management 
relations. In other words, while mobility can be expected to ease the problems of structural 
economic adjustment, an equal if not more important a criterion of micro flexibility is enterprise 
flexibility.  
In a recent study of the effect of German collective bargaining on employment growth 
using linked employer-employee data for the period 2000-2010, Brändle and Goerke (2015) find 
a (smaller) negative effect of some 0.8 percentage points a year on the basis of cross-sectional 
variation. However, the use of panel and difference-in-differences estimation, as well as further 
controls for time-invariant heterogeneity, suggests that there is no causal effect of collective 
bargaining on employment growth – the cross-section result seemingly reflecting negative 
selection into collective bargaining. The conclusion that German collective bargaining has no 
causal effect on employment growth may be interpreted as an absence of adverse effect and 
viewed as positive. But, as the authors themselves note, the fact remains that this study does 
not provide indications of the cause of country differences such as different industrial relations 
systems. Given the outcome indicator, there is also the issue of differences in time periods 
studied and in particular the role of Germany’s resurgent economy after 2000.   
The results of this section may be summarized as follows. First, unionism is associated 
with wage rigidity that constrains labor market (re)allocation, even if firm surveys suggest this is 
largely the case when labor contracts are signed at higher bargaining levels. Unions also seem 
to facilitate the use of alternative labor cost-cutting strategies. The importance of internal labor 
markets should not be underplayed, survey evidence again indicating that employers attach 
more importance to the internal wage structure when deciding on hiring pay, even if this 
tendency is more pronounced in union regimes. Although the survey evidence places emphasis 
on the finding that wages are more flexible when bargaining is decentralized (i.e. conducted at 
lower levels), these other considerations have also to be borne in mind together with the 
recognition that the manner in which the institutions of collective bargaining and worker 
representation are incorporated is rudimentary. Meantime, recent theoretical developments in 
the areas of collective voice and contract theory envisage a potentially pro-productive role for 
unions in aggregating worker preferences in the provision of workplace public goods and in 
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facilitating efficient contracting in situations where there is a long-term relation between worker 
and firm but where employers’ ex ante promises to take workers’ interests into account are not 
credible and where the reputation effects mechanism is weak. They caution that rigid nominal 
contracts may after all have a positive efficiency role. 
Although objective data for the United States would – to understate the case – indicate 
that the promise of unions remains unfulfilled, other-country data give grounds for less 
pessimism. Some of the more promising results are reported for the German dual system of 
sectoral bargaining in combination with workplace codetermination. Even if the German 
evidence is sui generis, given that nation’s unique institutions, we would note that sequential 
declines in the ‘disadvantages of unionism’ are reported for Britain’s decentralized collective 
bargaining system in tandem with legislation limiting union authority – material union-induced 
performance deficits in Britain in the 1980s being conventionally ascribed to multi-unionism. 
Research on high performance work practices in the United States, Germany and Britain also 
often sees unionism in more favorable light, although the empirical literature is frankly opaque 
on the union role as it is on the efficacy of the transformative labor relations practices 
themselves.  
Finally, there is historical support for the Nordic model in achieving reallocation while 
maintaining low unemployment. In a very real sense there is some correspondence here with 
the outcome of the Anglo-Saxon model, although the respective collective bargaining systems 
differ greatly as do the mix of other labor market institutions. Equally, cohesion or trust may link 
the very different German and Nordic models, albeit in different ways, and distinguish both from 
the British situation if one buys into Marsden’s (2015) interpretation of that nation’s work system 
as lean and managerial-directed, as opposed to Germany’s high discretion learning model of 
work organization (see Box A).  
3 Macro flexibility and collective bargaining 
In this section, we turn to the role played by collective bargaining institutions in achieving macro 
flexibility. We first provide a review of the evidence on the contribution of bargaining structure to 
the building blocks of full employment and the ability of the economy to respond appropriately to 
macroeconomic shocks. In this initial, first-pass procedure we seek to establish the state-of-play 
in mainstream research roughly up to the Great Recession. But since this research glosses over 
major changes in the architecture of collective bargaining – namely, a process of ongoing, even 
heightened, decentralization – we have also to provide a finer dissection of the framework of 
collective bargaining. Here we shall use Visser’s (2013) pioneering attempt to achieve 
comparability across time and countries of key institutional features as an organizing device on 
which to hang some more recent research; specifically, controversies/findings on collective 
bargaining coverage under extension agreements, the costs of those agreements, and the 
impact of contract innovation under decentralization. We shall also use that framework to revisit 
the theoretical controversy over bargaining level. We conclude with some thoughts on the 
‘competitiveness’ of bargaining structures as suggested in recent research.  
A broad brush initial approach 
Macro flexibility is equated with the ability of the economy to maintain a low unemployment rate 
in the face of macroeconomic shocks. According to Blanchard et al. (2013: 10), such flexibility 
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has two dimensions: a low average unemployment rate and modest fluctuations in the 
unemployment rate in response to shocks.  
There is a very large literature on the effects of collective bargaining on the level of 
unemployment. The early literature examined the link between union density or coverage as 
indicators of the degree of union monopoly power in the market and unemployment (and 
inflation), and adverse union effects were reported from the outset. Very soon, however, the 
union measure became more nuanced to reflect the structure of bargaining and the 
internalization of external wage effects – not just the simple exertion of market power. 
Internalization effects stem from the realization among unions in more centralized bargaining 
regimes that their wage increases will affect the price level that their members face, as well as 
unfavorable unemployment development and a loss in competitiveness. Accordingly, they will 
be less aggressive in their wage demands and take into account the macroeconomic 
implications of wage negotiations. The more decentralized the bargaining, the less wage 
externalities will be internalized. Accordingly, a straight-line relation between the degree of 
centralization of bargaining and economic outcomes was mooted: negative in slope for 
unemployment and positive for real wages. This centralization argument6 was challenged by the 
hump-shape thesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988), which emphasized the importance of product 
market effects, leading to differences in the ability to pass on wage increases through higher 
prices. Decentralized bargaining implies highly elastic demand curves so that competitive 
pressure from other firms in the same industry producing like goods now makes for moderation 
in wage demands. Just as with fully centralized bargaining the costs cannot be passed on to 
others. But this is not the case, so the argument runs, for industry-level bargaining which 
produces the worst outcome of all for the economy. Here the possibility for passing on wage 
increases is greater since all competing firms are affected equally by the wage hike and 
customers cannot so easily shift their patronage to other sectors. Hence the hump, occasioned 
by intermediate levels of bargaining (as represented by sectoral bargaining), delivers the worst 
unemployment and inflation performance.7   
However, bargaining structure is a more complicated construct than (degree of) 
centralization, and research was soon to argue that the coordination of industry level bargaining 
across the economy can serve as the functional equivalent of centralized bargaining. Thus, as 
noted by Traxler and Brandl (2009), none of the industry-level bargaining units can externalize 
the costs of wage hikes if their pay policies are coordinated. Indeed, to take up an issue that will 
be investigated later, coordination may be feasible at lower levels of bargaining, if, as in Japan, 
employer associations and national unions are vested with the authority to provide the requisite 
guidance to their constituent members. Notions of bargaining coordination tended to supplant 
prior models of the covariation of unionism and unemployment, notwithstanding the more 
obvious difficulties of measurement (than for union density, coverage, or even centralization). In 
terms of findings, despite some early results suggesting that countries with coordinated 
bargaining structures experienced lower equilibrium unemployment rates (e.g. Nickell 1997), the 
overall evidence is mixed. Aidt and Tzannatos (2008) provide a summary of 28 studies and 174 
sub-studies investigating the effects of coordination on a variety of outcome indicators to include 
unemployment. The measure of coordination varies widely across studies and in consequence 
the ranking of countries also varies. On a simple head count, 45 percent of the sub-studies 
support the view that coordination works, although the strength of the correlation between  
coordination and the outcome indicator varies considerably – the results are clearest for the 
wage distribution where there is strong evidence that greater coordination is associated with 
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lower wage dispersion (on which more in section 6).  Moreover, with the progression from 
simple correlations through regressions using cross country data to regressions employing 
pooled cross-country data (and a sprinkling of fixed effects specifications) the results in favor of 
the coordination thesis weaken and the harder it is to detect a relationship between bargaining 
coordination and economic performance. Another commonality noted by Aidt and Tzannatos is 
that coordination benefits, where observed, are more likely in the 1970s and the 1980s than in 
the 1990s (see also OECD 1997).  
At the price of some oversimplification,8 these results briefly summarize the state of play 
in research on collective bargaining and unemployment up to the present century and before the 
Great Recession, and therefore prior to a somewhat finer dissection of its role (recognition of 
which is one main task of the present treatment). The (pre-contemporary) context is the rise in 
unemployment between 1960 and the mid-1990s and the heterogeneity of individual country 
experiences. As Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) note, shocks in the form of a productivity 
slowdown and adverse shifts in labor demand can offer a potential explanation for the rise in 
unemployment but not cross-country differences because shocks display insufficient 
heterogeneity; while for their part labor market institutions can potentially explain cross country 
variation but not the rise in unemployment by reason of their broad stability. Blanchard and 
Wolfers offer an explanation for both stylized facts: the interaction between economic shocks 
and labor market institutions. Specifically, the authors’ regression analysis indicates that union 
density amplifies the adverse effect of shocks while coordination materially reduces the impact 
of shocks. It might therefore seem that one has an explanation for the strangely disappearing 
effects of bargaining coordination noted earlier: coordinated systems are more able to react to, 
or otherwise absorb, shocks – the supply shocks of the 1970s and the disinflationary policies of 
the 1980s – than they are to leverage more stable environments such as the 1990s.  
Unfortunately, all labor market institutions are subject to change (and not just the 
replacement rate and employment protection indices used by Blanchard and Wolfers in some 
specifications), and the use of time-invariant measures of union density and coordination are a 
cause for concern. Interestingly, a more recent analysis by Nickell et al. (2005) of 
unemployment development in the OECD countries over the same interval, now using annual 
data rather than the five year averages used by Blanchard and Wolfers, fully incorporates time-
varying institutions. The authors report that as much as 55 percent of broad movements in 
unemployment across the OECD nations can be explained by shifts in labor market institutions. 
However, interactions between average values of these institutions and shocks, now captured 
by time dummies, do not add materially to the explanation of changes in unemployment. 
Nevertheless, in common with Blanchard and Wolfers and some more recent research (e.g. 
Bowdler and Nunziata 2007), coordination is found to mitigate the harmful effect of union 
density on unemployment.   
Dissecting Changes in Collective Bargaining and Decentralization 
Despite the economist’s indicators of labor market institutions being fixed for often considerable 
periods of time, each is in reality time varying. Of late, this seems even more the case for 
collective bargaining institutions, the Great Recession and its aftermath marking the most recent 
interval of flux (see Visser, 2013, 2016; Addison et al. 2016b). In this section, we set the scene 
for our diagnosis by tracing some of the more important developments in collective bargaining in 
advanced industrial nations. Drawing extensively on Visser (2013), we organize our discussion 
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around the three dimensions of bargaining coverage, bargaining structure, and bargaining 
coordination.  
Bargaining coverage 
Bargaining coverage is widely held to be a more adequate expression of the degree of collective 
organization than union density. Major differences between the two measures are accounted for 
by extension agreements, considered below. Coverage and density rates for a sample of 
advanced industrial countries are provided in Table 1 for the years 1995-2010/2013. Not shown 
in the table are the long periods of stability in coverage for European nations up to the 1990s 
after which point there has been some slippage. For its part, the decline in density started much 
earlier and has been more dramatic, as the data in the final column of the table testify. The link 
between density and coverage though positive is fairly weak. More important is the link between 
multi-employer bargaining and coverage.  
(Table 1 near here) 
Countries in the table are organized according to whether bargaining is predominantly 
sectoral (in the upper panel of the table) or firm/enterprise based (lower panel). The balance of 
the countries (middle panel) have mixed systems. Under firm-level bargaining, declines in union 
density translate into declining coverage. Under sectoral bargaining, employers cannot easily 
escape collective agreements by switching to a non-union regime while remaining in the same 
sector. The most dramatic reductions in coverage rates have therefore attended a collapse of 
multi-employer bargaining and its replacement by single-employer bargaining (the U.K. in the 
1980s) and the withdrawal of government support for multi-employer bargaining (New Zealand 
after 1991 and Australia after 1996). Note that multiemployer bargaining depends importantly 
upon effective employer organization.9 
In discussing coverage, an important issue is extension agreements. In a good number 
of continental European nations, high levels of union coverage of 75 percent or more are 
achieved through a combination of sectoral (or higher) level bargaining, strong employer 
organization, and a widespread use of procedures for extending the terms of collective 
agreements. Of these the most important is administrative extension, whereby at the request of 
the parties the relevant government entity confirms the extension based on the terms of ruling 
agreements (or sometimes ‘enlarges’ collective agreements to sectors than have no collective 
agreements).  
Unsurprisingly, administrative extension is often requested by unions in decline as a 
form of revitalization from above. Equivalently, the collapse of collective bargaining in New 
Zealand can be directly attributed to the abolition of statutory wage fixing machinery and with it 
the extension procedures used to implement national awards of that nation’s Court of 
Arbitration. (Note that the arrangement whereby uncovered firms ‘orient’ themselves to a 
collective agreement is briefly addressed below as a special case because it is not underwritten 
by law.) Also, as a referee reminded us, the history of the institutions of extension is that small 
and medium-sized employers, and a coalition of Christian unions and parties, have pursued 
extension as a means of promoting self-regulation through collective bargaining, and mitigate or 
lessen class conflict.  
The case against extension arrangements was made forcefully in the OECD Jobs Study 
(OECD 1994) where it was proposed that administrative extension of agreements that impose 
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inflexible conditions should be phased out. Its main objections were twofold. First, extension 
was seen as relaxing the constraints on unions while, second, making employers more willing to 
accede to exaggerated wage demands. Employers may of course also favor extension as a 
means of preventing underbidding, the most recent example of this in a European context being 
the case of cross-border service provision. Requiring foreign service providers to meet domestic 
standards, as under extension laws in Denmark and Switzerland or as the basis for minimum 
wages in specific sectors as in Germany, may also be viewed as supportive of insider coalitions 
but the more general point is that extension serves a number of different purposes, including the 
creation of common standards or funding of apprenticeship, training and pre-retirement (Visser 
2016: 6). As a practical matter, the OECD position has softened in subsequent policy 
statements (e.g. OECD 2004) on the reasoning that unions might seek moderate wage 
increases in circumstances where they implicitly have to represent the views of all workers in a 
sector rather than more privileged groups for whom the unemployment risk is already 
attenuated. In other words, wage claims might be finessed in anticipation of their generalization 
under extension arrangements.  
Both positions are reflected in the analysis of Blanchard et al. (2013) who argue on the 
positive side of the ledger that, in sectors where there are a large numbers of small firms, 
transaction costs might preempt bargaining ab initio; and also that extension arrangements 
might rule out, or at least lessen, incentives to undercut reasonable wages and working 
conditions. On the negative side, however, Blanchard et al. (2013: 12) accept that: “At times, by 
allowing workers to benefit from bargaining outcomes even if they are not union members, they 
may decrease the representativeness, and by implication the legitimacy, of unions and, by so 
doing, decrease the quality of industrial relations.” (See also Flanagan et al. 1993: 424). The 
authors also recognize that flexibility might be impaired by extension procedures given 
productivity difference between firms, leading them to recommend temporary opt-outs for firms 
needing time to adjust as well as what they describe as “top-ups” for the most profitable 
enterprises.  
Based on the procedures, scope, and conditions surrounding extension arrangements, 
Visser (2013: Table 4) has provided a classification of extension regimes for a sample of 26 
European countries plus Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States (where, as in 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, extension mechanisms are in most cases absent).10 In addition 
to extension procedures per se, he notes a second ‘trajectory’ offering very high coverage rates 
of 75 percent or more that is found only in Scandinavia. It comprises sectoral (or national) 
bargaining and a high union density that can force non-unionized employers into line. Unlike the 
former combination of sectoral bargaining-strong employer organization-extension 
arrangements, which hinges on state support, this second trajectory rests upon a continuing 
organizational capacity on the part of unions. Given the reality of union decline, he concludes 
that high coverage rates will continue to depend on public intervention or at least a non-reversal 
of policies of open or tacit support for collective bargaining. He is pessimistic on this score, 
noting the dramatic effects of changes in public policy in the United Kingdom and New Zealand 
and Australia, recent events in countries depending on international financial assistance 
(Greece, Portugal, and Ireland) that are stated to have had a cooling effect on collective 
bargaining, plus developments in the new EU member states (the Baltics, Poland, and Hungary) 
where weak unions tempt employers to abandon collective bargaining.  
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This brings us to the issue of the costs of extension agreements. We earlier noted a 
qualified softening of the position of the OECD inter alia against extension agreements 
conditional on such factors as the representativeness of the social partners and the dispersion 
of productivity between firms. Note, however, that in the case of Portugal the OECD (2012a) 
flatly rejected extensions and recommended that they be abolished in their entirety. The OECD 
reasoned that extensions were used by dominant firms to impose higher wages and working 
conditions on others, reducing competition and entry in the process.  
(Box B near here) 
Our two case studies in Box B suggest that extending contracts potentially has large 
costs in terms of employment destruction, albeit ‘modified’ by increased labor market 
segmentation, and in amplifying aggregate shocks. These costs can be mitigated by (higher) 
representativeness thresholds, which can in principle preserve the usefulness of extension 
agreements such as preventing the undercutting of reasonable employment standards and 
sustaining collective bargaining. Another option would be to allow firms in difficulties to opt out, 
by exact analogy with opening clauses. (A more general analogy is the rule in Germany 
exempting the long-term unemployed from minimum wage legislation for the first six months of 
their employment.)  
Two other possibilities, noted by Villanueva (2015: 9), would be to make extensions 
nonbinding once a collective agreement has expired and even to switch to an opt-in system of 
collective bargaining, whereby sectoral- or higher-level bargaining collective agreements would 
make provision for non-negotiating and therefore non-signatory firms to sign on to an agreement 
ex post after the negotiation. However, the latter recommendation may be criticized as ignoring 
the point that foreclosing underbidding may be a precondition for sectoral collective bargaining 
in the first place, returning us to exemption based on ex ante defined criteria (on which more 
below). For its part, the former recommendation returns us to Box B. As our description of the 
Portuguese and Spanish experiences with extension as “unhappy” is meant to imply, one 
should distinguish between systems with automatic extension and the rest. More specifically, 
the issue here is the frequency of procedures regulating the “after effects” of collective 
agreements beyond their expiration. Such procedures are not the norm. 
There are two further issues. First, although we have perforce neglected other labor 
market institutions in this treatment, the first harks back to the interaction between extension 
agreements and other labor market policies (or indeed their absence). One obvious factor is the 
tax wedge, namely the difference between the cost of an employee to the firm and take home 
pay. In analysis of 15 OECD countries, 1965-2007, Murtin et al. (2014) report that the adverse 
effect of the tax wedge on unemployment is large in countries with liberal extension procedures 
(such as France and Spain) and minimal in nations where extension is limited or absent 
(Scandinavian nations). Second, in nations where extension is vestigial, there is the issue of 
whether the coverage statistics are downwardly biased in circumstances where uncovered (i.e. 
non-union) firms ‘shadow’ collective agreements in setting wages. Germany is often cited as a 
classic case in point. However, recent research does not suggest that such ‘orientation’ 
practices constitute an important source of undercounting (see Addison et al. 2016a).  
Bargaining structure  
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The decentralization of collective bargaining is a hallmark of industrial relations since the 1980s 
and can be considered as equal in importance to deunionization. That is, national (i.e. cross-
industry/intersectoral) bargaining has tended to give way to sectoral bargaining while local or 
enterprise bargaining has gained in prominence either by replacing sectoral bargaining or by 
acting as an additional layer of bargaining. Although decentralization has generally been 
welcomed by theorists, there remains sharp disagreement as to the preferred variant(s) that will 
be examined in the next subsection. 
Visser (2013) has offered a careful discussion of decentralization in which he 
distinguishes between the principal level at which collective bargaining takes place; a process of 
devolution within central or sectoral agreements whereby more issues are settled at local level; 
and the existence of use of opening clauses or ‘derogations’ from the terms of collective 
agreements. He also offers a composite indicator of decentralization, summing scores along 
each of these three dimensions.  
Beginning with bargaining level, Visser derives a five-point scale  in which company or 
enterprise level is considered the lowest level (=1) and where central or cross-industry 
bargaining with centrally binding norms is the highest level (=5). Since industry or sectoral 
bargaining is given an intermediate score (=3), it follows that there are two mixed situations 
between levels (5) and (3) and between (3) and (1). The next requirement is the identification of 
a dominant bargaining level which is fixed at two-thirds of the private-sector coverage rate. As of 
2000+ and abstracting from the eight Central and Eastern European (C.E.E.) member states, 
where company bargaining dominates (in six cases), he obtains the following distribution of 
countries by bargaining level: (a) company/enterprise level bargaining dominates – Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, the United States, and, since the 1990s, New Zealand; (b) 
sectoral bargaining dominates – Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, with Denmark being a 
borderline case given its material amount of company-level bargaining; and (c) mixed cases – 
Luxembourg, Australia, and France with an equal share of company and industry bargaining 
(see also Visser 2016: Table 3). 
Some noticeable trends include the special cases of decentralization from centralized 
cross-industry bargaining in the Scandinavian group of nations, although the sister Nordic 
country, Finland, has since returned to the fold of centralized, tax-based incomes policies; the 
dramatic changes in Ireland from centralized bargaining under successive regimes of social 
pacts to a restoration of company level bargaining after 2009; and the opposing trends towards 
and away from central bargaining in Belgium and the Netherlands, respectively.11 Comparing 
the frequencies of dominant bargaining levels over the interval 1960-2010, it is the case that 
industry bargaining which had come to dominate by 1980 has continued to do so in Western 
European nations. That said, the importance of enterprise bargaining in the large majority of the 
C.E.E. nations gives primacy to that form of bargaining on a headcount of the 30 nations in 
Visser’s sample. For its part, centralized bargaining is not entirely a thing of the past, given the 
nature of the national agreement in Greece in 2010, its resurrection in Finland, and government 
restrictions on wage increases in Belgium. 
But, as was noted earlier, the diversity in sectoral bargaining arrangements means that 
any classification of bargaining structure based solely on bargaining level is hazardous, and 
assuredly insufficient to address decentralization. Visser’s amplification of bargaining structure 
next turns to a distinction between two-level or two-tier bargaining and single-level bargaining. 
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This distinction does not apply only to sectoral bargaining, however, since centralized 
agreements may involve just a single level or allow for additional bargaining on pay.  
In discussing multi-level bargaining, Visser sees the key distinguishing characteristic to 
be one of articulation, which is defined as the extent to which additional bargaining on pay is 
under control of the union, and regulated and defined by the sectoral  (or central) agreement 
and subject to a peace clause. So the critical issue here is said to be governance capacity. Two-
tier systems are seen as operating within Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Spain, and 
Sweden. (Single-level multi-employer bargaining models, where as a rule no local bargains are 
assumed to obtain, include Austria, Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland.) Again on the basis of a ranking exercise, Visser’s conclusion with regard to 
systems with a systematic second bargaining round – so-called institutionalized two-tier 
bargaining – is that while multi-level bargaining has increased over time, fully-articulated 
bargaining is rare. The contemporary poorly articulated counterparts of Britain and Italy in the 
1970s and 1980s are identified as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Spain 
Another aspect of decentralization is opening clauses, which are of especial interest as 
they permit the setting of less favorable wages and working conditions at local level than were 
fixed under higher level agreements – typically at sectoral level. These include not only (one-
time) hardship agreements which are exceptional and temporary and designed to avert 
impending insolvency or major job loss but also opening clauses or opt-out arrangements that, 
while also seeking to apply contracts in ways less favorable than what has been agreed to at 
higher level, are more general in the sense that they are no longer tied to exceptional 
circumstances and not necessarily reversible in the next contract period. Such opt-out clauses 
have in practice been both conditional on approval by the collective bargaining parties or 
applied without such a condition.   
(Box C near here) 
The German experience with opening clauses is the best known, not least since such 
agreements have become institutionalized. Initially, opening clauses were concerned with 
working hours, including the accommodations that had to be made in the wake of negotiated 
reductions in working hours, and partly as a result of which negotiations involved workplace 
flexibility. Subsequently, opening clauses became concerned with pay. And latterly, they have in 
part morphed into pacts for employment and competitiveness that take on the characteristics of 
integrative bargaining. Case studies of opening clauses and pacts are contained in Box C. 
Table 2 provides descriptive information on the spread of opening clauses and pacts for 
employment and competitiveness in Germany using unweighted data.  
(Table 2 near here)  
Focusing here on the issue of pay concessions, it is clear that decentralized wage 
bargaining proper may involve counterparts to opening clauses. Visser identifies arrangements 
in in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands as cases in point. In 
countries such as Sweden and Denmark, opening clauses are described as ‘generalized,’ in the 
sense that local bargaining controls much more of total earnings, more of which is tied to 
performance. In Norway, on the other hand, the use of opening clauses has been sporadic. The 
same is true of the Netherlands and Switzerland, where the clearest examples of formal 
opening clauses are from the past rather than contemporary in nature. While noting that this is 
also true of Austria, Visser cites the more recent case of the location clause contained in the 
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2011 metalworkers’ collective agreement that permits poorly performing companies to divide the 
collectively negotiated wage increase into a general part and a contingent, individual 
performance-related component.  
France, for its part, is something of a sport given the unimplemented components of 
collective agreements, exemptions to minimum wage agreements, the much larger role of 
variable pay, and the generally increased autonomy of the firm from the wider industrial 
relations system. All such developments display features analogous to opening clauses.  
Southern Europe also remains something of an exception given what Visser (2013: 50) 
refers to as the “hierarchical layering of agreements based on the favorability principle.” That 
said, he notes inter al. an Italian central agreement of 2011 permitting enterprise agreements to 
introduce temporary and experimental modification of the provisions in sectoral agreements; a 
Spanish  framework agreement of 2012 allowing extended use of opening clauses on working 
time, pay  systems, and work organization in the event of a persistent decline in revenues; and 
Greek legislation of 2010 allowing company agreements to derogate from the terms and 
conditions of sectoral agreements in cases of economic hardship, and indeed the reforms of 
2011 that reversed the hierarchy of agreements, now giving precedence to the firm-level over 
the sectoral level. At issue, of course, is the longevity of these special arrangements.  
Finally, the development of partnership agreements in Ireland and the U.K., analogous 
to the German pacts for employment and competitiveness (see panel (b) of Box C), can 
theoretically play a crucial part in recasting the organization of the workplace and meeting the 
prime allocative requirement of flexibility. We note parenthetically that under the now defunct 
Irish partnership programs, inability to pay was also a factor allowing derogation from the 
general rounds of wage increases contained therein.  
Visser’s indicators of the extent to which multilevel agreements are articulated and of the 
scope for opening clauses (or derogations)  thus provides a basis for differentiating among 
nations in which sectoral bargaining dominates.    
Bargaining coordination  
As was noted at the beginning of this section, coordination succeeded centralization as a 
favored construct in modeling the effect of collective bargaining on wage and unemployment 
outcomes. Coordination may be defined as the synchronization of the pay policies of distinct 
bargaining units. Unfortunately, its measurement is by no means transparent. Visser (2013) 
seeks to throw more light on the issue by discussing modes and extent of coordination. The 
former refers to the methods designed to achieve coordination, and is thus not parametric. The 
latter offers an attempt at measurement based on expectations about institutional features that 
are likely to generate either more or less coordination. 
The modes approach is based on Traxler et al. (2001). One such mode is state imposed 
bargaining based on statutory controls, examples of which are today restricted to just Belgium 
and Greece. State sponsored bargaining or social pacts (see section 4) are an altogether more 
common type, and have been deployed consistently in Finland, and Ireland (where they have 
dominated recent experience) as well as the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain. A third mode, inter-
associational bargaining, which refers to binding central agreements as practiced in Sweden, 
Norway, and Denmark in the 1980s, is today a rarity – the  sole contemporary example being 
Spain – partly by reason of the decline in the market share of these peak organizations. Pattern 
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bargaining, on the other hand, is a more familiar vehicle of contemporary coordination, and is 
dominant in Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany and Japan. Intra-associational or so-
called ‘informal coordination’ occurs where guidance is offered by the major union or employer 
confederations without agreements between themselves. Finally, an absence of coordination – 
the uncoordinated bargaining mode – may nevertheless exhibit coordination where there is 
some external influence upon wage bargaining. The classic example is the minimum wage 
machinery of SMIC (Salaire Minimum de Croissance) in France which shores up an entire wage 
structure.12  
In offering a measure of coordination, Visser seeks to allow for variation in the extent of 
coordination within a particular mode of coordination. The upshot is that there is a positive but 
not overwhelming correlation between the mode or mechanism and the actual degree of 
coordination. This is because the highest levels of coordination are based on different 
mechanisms. Thus, for the top 10 ranked countries as of 1995-2010, the mechanisms are as 
follows: Belgium – state-imposed central bargaining; Finland – social pacts; Japan – pattern 
bargaining based on enterprise bargaining; Norway – pattern bargaining based on industry 
bargaining; Austria – pattern bargaining based on industry bargaining; Denmark – pattern 
bargaining based on industry bargaining; Sweden – pattern bargaining based on industry 
bargaining; Ireland – social pacts; Germany – pattern bargaining based on industry bargaining; 
the Netherlands – associational coordination. An updated ranking for 2001-14 is provided in 
Visser (2016: Table 4). This contains the same countries with the exception of Ireland (replaced 
by Luxembourg) which now joins the lowest-ranked countries by extent of coordination with the 
collapse of state-sponsored bargaining in that nation. That said, there is seemingly no general 
trend in coordination in recent years in Western Europe.  
Visser’s careful description of the institutions of collective bargaining along the three 
dimensions of bargaining coverage, structure, and coordination raises a number of issues, only 
some of which have been addressed thus far. The dominant theme is of course 
decentralization, which development seems both incontrovertible and irreversible. While justified 
on flexibility grounds, however, decentralization raises two main issues. The first has to do with 
the appropriate model of collective bargaining. Given that coordination has been shown to be 
important for macroeconomic adjustment, a combination of national and firm-level bargaining 
might well be indicated, although efficient forms of sectoral bargaining would seem to garner 
support from recent empirical findings on contract innovations made under sectoral bargaining 
in Germany (and perhaps under an evolving Scandinavian model as well). Second, however, 
decentralization can be destabilizing or disorganized, again raising the question of support from 
above. More bluntly, Visser’s (2013: 65) characterization of wage-setting institutions as being in 
in a “state of turmoil” augurs ill for trust, which may be a more critical factor for achieving macro 
stability than any particular bargaining structure. 
The controversy over firm-level and sector-level bargaining redux  
Some of the most recent theoretical work has focused on the advantages of decentralization, 
and in particular plant-level bargaining, stimulated at least in part by influential forces in 
Germany recommending outright decentralization or at least further decentralization of 
bargaining (e.g. Berthold and Fehn 1996; German Council of Economic Experts 1996). 
Interestingly, however, Fitzenberger and Franz (1999a, 1999b) were to offer an early defense of 
the German sectoral bargaining status quo ante. Their defense rested on the incorporation of 
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insider-outsider considerations into a theoretical model of employment in which outsiders who 
are unemployed in the previous period are less productive than incumbents, who are in turn 
assumed to carry more weight in union councils (i.e. via the union’s utility function). Demand is 
uncertain at the time of bargaining when wages are set, and the union’s wage policy determines 
the expected number of workers in the current period, actual employment being determined in 
the next period. A monopoly union model is assumed with employment being set at the firm 
level. Under firm-level bargaining, a union maximizes its utility conditional on the number of 
insiders in the firm, whereas under industry bargaining a uniform wage is set for all firms in that 
branch.  
The theoretical outcome of the model being ambiguous under either a myopic union 
scenario or its converse (i.e. where unions have a long-run orientation and take employment 
effects unto account), the relative performance of the two bargaining systems with respect to the 
employment outcome is shown to hinge on the values of the (five) key parameters of the 
model.13 The authors’ simulations for different values of these parameters show that industry-
level bargaining can indeed outperform firm-level bargaining in circumstances where unions 
place greater weight on employment relative to wages and evince more of a long-run orientation 
in wage setting. But the result is not guaranteed. Thus, a higher relative weight of the wage in 
the union utility function or a higher alternative (non-union) income can swing the balance back 
in favor of firm-level bargaining. On this analysis, then, the superiority of industry bargaining 
over firm-level bargaining hinges on unions in the latter scenario seeing the gain from higher 
employment through wage moderation as being dwarfed in practice by the benefits from 
pursuing the interests of insiders.  
More recent theorizing favors a fully-fledged decentralization of collective bargaining. 
Thus, Jimeno and Thomas (2013) seek to demonstrate the superiority of firm-level bargaining 
from an unemployment perspective. Unemployment is taken to be the result of endogenous 
gross job creation and gross job destruction flows. The key to the authors’ analysis of differential 
labor market performance is firm heterogeneity in productivity levels and wages that are 
alternatively determined by firm-specific productivity and sector-wide average productivity 
(implying wage compression). The theoretical result of the model is that unemployment is 
elevated under sectoral bargaining as the job destruction threshold is greater, so that low 
productivity jobs that would survive/be generated in firm-level bargaining would be 
destroyed/not created under sectoral bargaining. Further, the anticipation of lower or zero profits 
for low productivity jobs discourages vacancy posting in sectoral bargaining regimes. Given the 
authors’ search and matching model (with Nash bargaining), it follows from the model that 
unemployment rates will be lower under firm-level bargaining. Furthermore, Jimeno and 
Thomas assess numerically the magnitude of this underperformance by calibrating their model 
to an average continental European economy, where the baseline is sectoral level bargaining. It 
is calculated that the steady-state effects of moving to a firm-level bargaining scenario in which 
every firm bargains individually with its workers would reduce the unemployment rate by 3.2 
percentage points.  
Nevertheless, they also demonstrate that were it possible to (costlessly) opt out from a 
sectoral agreement and negotiate a new firm-level agreement in an efficient manner (i.e. where 
such an arrangement was mutually beneficial), the resulting job destruction and creation rates 
and unemployment under sectoral bargaining can mimic those of firm-level bargaining. The 
situation is characterized by a productivity threshold that is lower for opting out firms than for 
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their non-opting-out counterparts and which is identical to that in the firm-level bargaining 
case(s). Finally, quite apart from the issue of efficient opting out, the authors recognize that the 
superiority of firm-level bargaining in their model depends on one single characteristic of 
collective bargaining and one single route (viz. wage compression).14  
Another recent study by Boeri (2014) updates the bargaining framework in modeling 
two-tier bargaining structures, defined as multi-employer agreements that coexist with 
supplementary plant or firm-level single employer agreements over pay and other conditions of 
employment. The reference point remains stand-alone firm-level bargaining as in the previous 
analyses. At the level of theory, Boeri argues that two-tier systems are inefficient because 
single-employer bargaining – as opposed to multi-employer bargaining under a right-to-manage 
mechanism – allows for efficient contracts involving both wages and employment. Since two-tier 
bargaining is construed as operating with a wage floor imposed by multi-employer bargaining, it 
reduces the scope of plant level bargaining by shrinking the range of efficient contracts. On this 
view, then, no Pareto improvements are afforded by supplementary decentralized bargaining. 
Now in a setting of large productivity differentials across firms and regions, multi-
employer bargaining by compressing nominal wage structures through conventional national 
agreements can lead to inefficient outcomes and distort incentives. Also, in taking industry 
bargaining as a wage floor, multi-level bargaining may amount to “paying twice” by setting a 
wage that can only be exceeded. But any consideration of how the two tiers might interact and 
how bargaining is articulated is suppressed in this treatment. Instead, the model rather assumes 
a structure that combines the “pay rigidity of centralized systems with the inattention to 
macroeconomic constraints of decentralized systems” (Boeri 2015: 1).15   
There are just two justifications for two-tier bargaining in Boeri’s schema. First, sectoral 
agreements could be retained for those firms where plant-level bargaining does not take place. 
Second, and more positively, there is scope for multi-employer agreements that set rules rather 
than wage changes to be applied uniformly to all firms irrespective of their performance. 
Somewhat reminiscent of some modern Scandinavian practice, the rules in question would 
govern the proportion of operational value added going to workers. He argues that these 
reforms would provide a (better) means of reconciling microeconomic flexibility with 
macroeconomic stability than two-tier bargaining per se. But to repeat, whether multi-level 
bargaining as currently practiced might be an intermediate step in this direction or whether it can 
be construed as pursuing decentralization consistent with single-employer bargaining while 
preserving degrees of freedom in macro adjustment is nowhere addressed.  
It is entirely appropriate to subject collective bargaining structures to detailed theoretical 
and empirical scrutiny. And in the process, different structures may as we have seen evince 
compatibility. Nevertheless, against the backdrop of Visser’s discussion, it may be argued that 
alternative bargaining structures have been accorded insufficient attention in recent theoretical 
models. One such potentially important characteristic is the synchronization of pay policies of 
distinct bargaining units, or coordination. The final application considered in this section 
(re)introduces pattern bargaining as a means of coordination.  
The heterogeneity of bargainers 
Traxler and Brandl (2012) have considered the impact of bargaining structure on 
competitiveness viewed from the perspective of international trade/competitiveness and the 
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importance of the heterogeneity of bargainers in their exposure to world markets. It is argued 
that the ‘competitiveness’ of a bargaining structure bargaining structure depends on its ability to 
cope with intersectoral productivity differentials between the trading/exposed and 
nontrading/sheltered sectors. The solution is said to require a nonegalitarian coordination of pay 
policies across the economy under the hegemony of the exposed sector (i.e. maintaining higher 
pay in the trading sector).  
How might different bargaining structures deal with the problem? The authors envisage 
three such structures: peak level coordination, pattern bargaining (termed intermediate 
coordination), and uncoordinated systems. The core problem of peak-level coordination is 
uncertainty as to whether the redistributional compromise as set by the median affiliate holds, 
and this is said to depend on vertical coordination, namely whether the affiliates can bind lower 
levels (see Traxler et al. 2001). Accordingly, peak level coordination is characterized by either 
high governability or low governability. For its part, pattern bargaining with pattern setting by the 
exposed sector can theoretically fix percentage increases in pay below overall productivity 
growth while maintaining traditional differentials in favor of the trading sector. There results a 
moderate rate of increase in wages, where the pattern defines the ceiling for other settlements.  
Finally, since uncoordinated single-employer bargaining theoretically has the advantage of at all 
times achieving internalized pay settlements, there is supposedly neither the need nor the ability 
of the bargainers under perfect competition to respond to inter-sectoral heterogeneity. This 
advantage evaporates where there is imperfect competition in product markets, price setting 
power allowing externalized wage increases.  
To evaluate the performance of the (4) different bargaining categories (state-imposed 
coordination serving as the reference category) the authors present a time-series cross-section 
analysis of the determinants of the growth rate of nominal labor cost, the unemployment rate, 
and the current account balance for a sample of 18 countries, 1981-2002. In addition to 
bargaining structure, the other key RHS variable is differences in productivity growth between 
the trading and non-trading sectors. Beginning with nominal labor costs, it is found that peak 
level coordination under low governability performs significantly worse than any other 
alternative. Although the other categories do not differ from the reference category of state-
imposed coordination, the interaction term between pattern bargaining and intersectoral 
productivity differences is significantly negative, suggesting that the dampening effect of pattern 
bargaining on costs grows with widening productivity differentials. For its part, there is no effect 
of bargaining structure on unemployment. Finally, as far as the current balance is concerned, 
pattern bargaining (and peak level bargaining with high governability) are associated with 
improved current balance. The bottom line of this empirical inquiry is that international 
competition rather than monetary signals influence the performance of bargaining, and that 
exposed-sector led pattern bargaining offers the best fit to deregulated market 
internationalization, not bargaining decentralization per se.16 Note however one interesting result 
of this treatment: this model of coordinated pay policy while embracing international 
competitiveness “lacks comparative advantages in preserving employment” (Traxler and Brandl 
2012: 94). 
Summary 
By way of summary, we began with a review of the empirical literature on bargaining structure 
and macroeconomic performance. This provided rather mixed results, especially after allowing 
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for changes in institutions over time, but gave broad support to coordination mechanisms as a 
means of dealing with macro shocks, or at least in ameliorating the rougher edges of union 
impact. Since the empirical literature largely failed to incorporate a dominant characteristic of 
collective bargaining since the 1990s, namely decentralization, we next focused on Visser’s 
(2013) detailed and updated discussion of national collective bargaining institutions, 
documenting changes in bargaining coverage, the structure of bargaining, and bargaining 
coordination over time. His discussion of national systems contains a wealth of information on 
changing collective bargaining arrangements. Arguably, the diversity of practice within 
bargaining categories that is revealed is more instructive than the summary rank scores that are 
derived. In any event, this is one reason we have not commented upon, say, his final all-
embracing centralization measure, or more directly sought to employ this or other of his 
parametric measures (e.g. coordination scores) in regression exercises analogous to those 
discussed at the beginning of this section. Rather, as far as empirical work is concerned, our 
preference has been instead wherever possible to identify findings from key studies of 
innovative practices associated with decentralization while investigating the impact of 
‘supportive’ extension ordinances.  
Decentralization and coordination are the key issues for modern research into the design 
of fit-for-purpose collective bargaining institutions from the perspective of microeconomic and 
macroeconomic flexibility. The modern theoretical developments examined in this section 
generally applaud the decentralization of bargaining. Perhaps with an eye to coordination they 
also recognize that sectoral bargaining with opt-outs and rule setting (rather than uniform wage 
changes) under multi-employer agreements can mimic the results of their decentralized 
bargaining models. That said, given the diversity of multi-employer bargaining revealed in 
Visser’s pioneering treatment, insufficient attention has been given to sectoral bargaining and to 
coordination. We sought to illustrate this lacuna by reference to exposed sector-led pattern 
bargaining pattern bargaining, which may also be seen as offering endorsement for the German 
model from another perspective. But this is not the only possibility and research should turn to 
the different design features of sector-level bargaining systems that are more or less helpful in 
achieving micro and macro flexibility. Thus, for example, we alluded earlier to the modern 
Scandinavian model by which we meant industry agreements that allow a significant amount of 
pay to be performance related, and that function as defaults while gaining centralizing traction 
from mediation procedures.       
 
Two final considerations are, firstly, the general failure of the modern literature to 
address the endogeneity of collective bargaining (for an exception, see Boeri and Burda 2009) 
and, relatedly, the sparse consideration accorded wage moderation under decentralization vis-
à-vis individual wage negotiations. In the latter context, and on the basis of German data, Ochel 
(2005) concludes that there is no indication that the growth of company-level collective 
agreements has led to more moderate settlements. He also argues that agreements based on 
contractual opt-out clauses have not resulted in more moderate wage contracts than at the 
branch level while achieving wage flexibility. However, as we have seen, it is all too easy to 
miss the wage cuts that result from the application as opposed to the existence of opening 
clauses and the nature of the insurance function. Moreover, research by Garloff and Guertzgen 
(2012) suggests that flexibility provisions under sectoral agreements do affect the sensitivity of 
wages to local firm conditions once account is taken of more poorly performing firms. The latter 
study also reminds us that rising wages are not destructive of the decentralization argument, a 
result that is underscored by emerging evidence on favorable productivity development under 
successor pacts. 
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4 The neglected issue of trust 
In an important qualifying comment on the implications of alternative collective bargaining 
institutions for macro flexibility, it has recently been argued by Blanchard et al. (2013: 20) that 
“trust among the social partners appears to be just as important in bringing about macro 
flexibility as the structure of collective bargaining.” Trust may of course be no less important in 
achieving micro flexibility, and we have already commented on the potential of collective voice 
to improve the functioning of internal labor markets and generate productivity growth. It will be 
recalled that the value-enhancing role of (union) collective voice hinges crucially in the model 
upon a constructive institutional response from management and a cooperative industrial 
relations environment. We also noted that analyses of strikes have offered some interesting 
insights into the quality of industrial relations at the workplace and the effect of the latter on 
productivity and on output quality. We now turn to consider trust more directly. First, at a more 
general level, we consider the association between trust and unemployment, together with 
some research findings on the relation between trust and the design and quantity of labor 
market legislation. Second, and more connected to our prior analysis, we examine whether trust 
has diminished as a result of the ‘turmoil’ in wage-setting institutions diagnosed by Visser 
(2013), and address social pacts that may either be viewed as requiring trust or as substituting 
for it. There are intriguing indications of trust considerations helping shape labor market 
institutions and influencing economic outcomes. 
Trust and Unemployment 
As far as macro outcomes are concerned, simple correlations linking trust and unemployment 
point to strong negative cross-country associations. Figure 1 presents one such archetypal 
relation between trust and macro performance for a sample of 21 OECD countries. The 
indicator of trust is that reported in the 1999 Global Competitiveness Report, published by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF), and the outcome indicator is the corresponding unemployment 
rate in 2000. The measure of trust was derived from the answers of senior executives to the 
following question in the WEF survey: “Labor/employee relations are generally cooperative.” 
Responses can vary from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement), and where actual 
mean responses varied from 6.4 for Switzerland to 3.3 for France. The R2 for this linear 
relationship is 0.55. An increase in trust from 3.3 to 6.4 is associated with a decrease in 
unemployment of 7.7 percentage points.  
(Figure 1 near here) 
The key question is of course whether the association remains significant when other 
labor market institutions are included. Blanchard and Phillipon (2004) have concluded that this 
in indeed the case in a multivariate analysis of labor relations and unemployment, 1979-2002. 
Their basic argument is that in countries where wages are largely determined by collective 
bargaining, the effect on unemployment of changes in the economic environment will depend in 
large part on the speed of learning of unions. The latter is seen as a reflection of the quality of 
the dialogue between the two sides, or the quality of industrial relations. Taking a cue from the 
U.S. micro literature, Blanchard and Phillipon proxy industrial relations quality by strike intensity 
averaged over 1960-67. 
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The authors first present simple regressions of unemployment in each of four decades 
(1965-74. 1975-84, 1985-94, and 1995-2003) on the strikes measure and then on a second 
direct measure based on the perceptions of business executives of the quality of industrial 
relations, as reported in the WEF survey mentioned earlier. Since the outcome measure might 
be reflected in the responses, Blanchard and Phillipon ultimately use the 1960-67 strike data to 
provide a predicted value for the 1999 survey measure. (See also Blanchard and Phillipon 2006, 
who use historical evidence on the attitude of the State toward early unions in the 19th century to 
construct an instrument for labor relations in 1999.) The simple regressions indicate a strong 
and statistically significant effect of the quality of industrial relations (all three measures) on 
unemployment.  
The authors’ preferred specification interacts the instrumented measure of the quality of 
industrial relations with unobservable shocks common to all 18 OECD countries in their sample. 
In fact, this indicator of cooperation is but one of nine institutional variables in the model 
(including coordination of bargaining), so that the impact of a common shock depends on a 
linear combination of all nine institutional arguments. Strikes remain positively related to 
unemployment and although the point estimate declines somewhat in magnitude it is still highly 
significant when the other eight regressors are added to the equation. The bottom line of this 
inquiry is therefore that countries with inferior labor relations/lower trust have paid a stiff price in 
terms of elevated joblessness and that the beneficial quality effect is additional to any structural 
benefits provided by union and employer coordination in collective bargaining.  
Addison and Teixeira (2009) attempted to replicate the above model in an approach 
incorporating a number of innovations such as the use of time-varying institutional variables 
(including the strikes measure). Support for the notion that macro performance owes something 
to good industrial relations found in pooled OLS estimates no longer holds when the authors 
control for country effects in their baseline model and add country dummies to the non-linear 
version of the model. Similarly, use of a first-pass procedure designed to control for the 
endogeneity of strikes fails to resurrect the Blanchard-Phillipon result. That said, these 
conclusions are necessarily tentative because of potentially serious measurement error in the 
strikes variable. Accordingly, this is emphatically not the last word on trust and unemployment. 
Trust and Labor Laws  
Recent work on trust has focused on the role of civic attitudes (highly related to trust) in 
explaining labor market institutions and the relation between state regulation of labor markets 
and the quality of industrial relations. On the former question, Algan and Cahuc (2009) have 
examined the balance between two related labor market institutions designed to offer protection 
from job loss, namely unemployment insurance benefits and job protection legislation in a 
sample of OECD countries, 1980-2003. They report that countries displaying high civic values – 
proxied by answers to the question do you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or 
something in between to claim government/state/ benefits to which you have no right? – tend to 
insure their workers through unemployment benefits instead of using stringent employment 
protection. That this relation is a causal is suggested by a unique epidemiological approach 
using the inherited part of civic attitudes as an instrument for civic attitudes in the home country. 
Vulgo: moral hazard – the product of un-civic attitudes – influences the implementation of 
efficient labor market institutions. 
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On the latter question concerning state regulation and the quality of industrial relations, 
Aghion et al. (2011) exploit the negative association between state regulation of minimum 
wages and the quality of industrial relations (the latter again based on World Competitiveness 
Report data). The authors contend that this relation will reflect different ways of regulating labor 
markets – either through the state or through civil society (i.e. unionism), depending on the 
degree of cooperation in the economy. On the authors’ model, distrustful labor relations lead to 
low unionization and a high demand for state regulation of wages. Once in place, strong state 
regulation crowds out the possibility for workers to engage in negotiation and learn about the 
potentially cooperative nature of labor relations. As a result there can be multiple equilibria; with 
a bad equilibrium characterized by poor, uncooperative industrial relations and extensive state 
regulation of the minimum wage, and a good equilibrium in which labor relations are cooperative 
as indexed by high union density and low state regulation.  
Trust and the Pace of Change 
Has the pace of institutional change – charted by Visser (2013, 2016) in particular – impaired 
trust and with it the efficacy of collective bargaining as reflected in economic performance. A 
very recent study by Brandl and Ibsen (2015) offers a preliminary investigation of this issue. The 
basic idea is that that institutional stability fosters trust between organized labor and capital by 
creating mutual expectations about behavior that underpin stable wage determination and the 
provision of the public good of wage moderation.  For its part, change implies collective action 
problems and an increase in transaction costs of a short-to-medium term (two to four year) 
nature. The hypotheses are tested with annual data from 1965 to 2010 for 33 countries using 
time-series cross-section methods. The dependent variables are twofold: inflation and the 
unemployment rate. The key RHS variable, institutional instability, is based on changes in the 
structure of the coordination of collective bargaining. Five such categories are identified: 
company-wide/uncoordinated bargaining; company-wide/weakly coordinated bargaining; 
industry-wide/weakly coordinated bargaining; industry-wide/coordinated bargaining; and 
economy-wide bargaining. The ‘magnitude’ of change is not measured and in the first instance 
neither is the direction of change. However, the frequency of changes is captured. It is assumed 
that negative effect on trust weakens through time; operationally, the time taken to restore trust 
is set at one, two, or four years. Controls include economic, collective bargaining, and industrial 
relations variables.   
It is reported that that the more frequently the institutional structure of collective 
bargaining is changed, the more pronounced is unemployment and the higher is inflation, from 
which result the authors contend that there are no net benefits of new institutional structures for 
up to four years after the transition. The contribution of the five collective bargaining and 
industrial relations controls is both modest and limited to the unemployment outcome – more 
coordinated bargaining being associated with lower unemployment and higher union density 
with greater unemployment. Distinguishing between the direction of change in the structure of 
coordination does not change the results qualitatively; that is, both directional movements are 
associated with elevated unemployment and higher inflation.17 
Trust and Social Pacts 
A separate literature that may be viewed as incorporating trust, or lack thereof, has focused on 
social pacts, namely macro-level tripartite arrangements that are designed to improve economic 
performance through wage moderation, to synchronize bargaining with economic policy so that 
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the macro goals of competitiveness and price stability can be met. Social pacts have been 
negotiated in a number of European countries.  Their use has been frequent in Finland and 
Ireland where they have taken the form of tax-based incomes policies, and also but rather 
differently in the Netherlands and Italy. In the Netherlands, pacts have been instruments to 
adjust expectations downward and moderate wage demands in times of crisis, the 1982 
Wassenaar Agreement being the classic example; in Italy (and also in Spain), they have 
established framework rules for industry and company bargaining.  
Whatever the achievements of pacts in facilitating a favorable adjustment of prices and 
wages in the face of major economic shocks, and in securing improvements in labor markets in 
difficult circumstances, they are intrinsically fragile instruments in their coordination. In this 
regard, it is commonplace to allude to the collapse of social partnership in Ireland in 2009 and to 
the withdrawal of Fiat from the employers’ confederation Confindustria in 2012. Social pacts are 
necessarily contingent institutions that, even where accompanied by supportive networks, and 
systems of mutual commitment and obligation, are difficult to negotiate and stabilize (see 
Avdagic et al. 2011). 
One strand of the analysis of pacts has seen their success as reflecting mutual trust 
among the economic actors and their failure as indicating an absence of trust. The remarkable 
improvement in the Dutch economy post 1982 has been linked to that nation’s culture of a 
search for consensus in combination with a far-reaching institutional consultation structure that 
has produced an environment of mutual trust and cooperation. By the same token, the abortive 
negotiations in Greece and Portugal during the most recent economic crisis have been linked 
(albeit less formally) to a lack of trust between the government and the social partners.  
The Dutch case has been the subject of more detailed scrutiny. In particular, Den Butter 
and Mosch (2003) discuss the manner in which the Dutch (or polder) model has been able to 
produce interpersonal and inter-organizational trust and how that trust resulted in sound 
economic policies. In the former context, having addressed the social characteristic of the drive 
for consensus in that nation, the authors identify the major players involved in policy; chiefly, the 
advisory Central Planning Bureau, and the consultative bodies of the bilateral Foundation of 
Labor and the tripartite Social Economic Council. The workings of the economy are described 
by the independent Central Planning Board’s economic models and the balancing of the 
different points of view is arranged by the government in dialogue with unions, employer 
organizations, and other organized interests.  Deliberations of the employers and unions in the 
Foundation of Labor on labor standards are manifested in so-called central agreements. For its 
part, the Social Economic Council serves as the main policy advisory board for the government 
on social and economic matters. Interestingly, although the government freed itself of the 
obligation to consult this body on all social-economic matters in 1995, the result was to stimulate 
consensus building such that the Council now issues unanimous if nonbinding policy 
recommendations to the government. The negotiators in the Council meet regularly, both 
formally and informally.  
In discussing wage negotiations at central, industry, and micro level, Den Butter and 
Mosch pay especial attention to the specific incentives offered the parties to cooperate and 
reach agreement. In the process, it is argued that the Dutch institutional framework closely 
conforms with micro arguments on how to build trust-enhancing networks. In examining the 
specific micro conditions of Dutch policy and the manner in which trust contributes to economic 
growth, the authors anchor their analysis in the hold-up problem that characterizes the wage 
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setting process. The solution to the problem of opportunism that arises is to assign the right to 
adjust contracts to a higher level, negotiators at this level being less prone to opportunism.  
This leads to the final component of the analysis, namely how trust translates into sound 
economic policies. Here the practicalities are those of the Wassenaar agreement reached in the 
Foundation of Labor. Between 1982 and 2000, unemployment fell from a high of 14 percent to a 
low of 2.5 percent, labor participation rose from 52 percent to the European average of 65 
percent, and government finances moved into surplus from an 8.5 percent deficit. As noted 
above, this agreement linked wage moderation to a reduction in working hours. It was non-
binding and therefore a point for negotiations about labor standards at lower levels. But it 
changed the outcomes of negotiations at industry and firm levels and was indeed to be followed 
by a series of further central agreements. Stimulus was provided by the economic model of the 
Central Planning Bureau that pointed to strong employment growth from lower labor costs. The 
agreement also marked a retreat of government from labor-market negotiations, although it was 
to support Wassenaar by reducing taxes and social security premiums. Currently, the 
government leans on the bargaining table at times of economic downturn in an attempt to 
garner support for wage moderation. And today, as in the past, there are instances of 
government support for wage moderation; for example, in 2009/10 it helped finance temporary 
short time working on the German pattern. But the direct intervention that characterized its 
activity in the years before 1982 is a thing of the past.18  
Another strand of the literature on social pacts has focused on the shift in their nature. 
According to Hassel (2003: 722), the social pacts of the 1980s and 1990s are to be 
distinguished from the neo-corporatist policies of the 1970s that involved a political exchange of 
wage restraint for policy concessions, the new pacts being instead interactions between 
government and unions in which governments set new tighter conditions for wage bargaining. 
On this view, pacts might at a pinch be depicted as a substitute for trust, not least given their 
occurrence in some “unlikely countries.”  
Taken as a whole these results of incorporating trust “into the equation” are to be 
welcomed. Although there are many unsettled issues (e.g. causation), there are distinct 
indications that trust may shape labor market institutions and influence economic outcomes. 
One pressing research concern, however, is identification of the design features of collective 
bargaining that help build trust.  
5 Earnings Dispersion 
If the simple associations between institutional regimes and macroeconomic performance 
demonstrate fragility over time, there is one striking exception: the negative association between 
unionism and earnings dispersion, whether we are speaking of union density, coverage, or 
bargaining structure/coordination (see, inter al., Flanagan 2003). Equivalently, union decline is 
allied to rising inequality. We will examine the historical evidence in more detail below, but first 
we examine the relevance of inequality to macroeconomic outcomes. Here one of the factors 
considered in the preceding section as potentially important in bringing about macroeconomic 
flexibility – trust – may itself be an inverse function of inequality.    
Inequality and Macro Outcomes 
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According to Dabla-Norris et al. (2015), the prime reason for concern over rising inequality is 
that income distribution matters for growth. Using a model in which GDP growth is regressed on 
initial income, lagged GDP growth, and inequality as proxied by the Net Gini coefficient (i.e. net 
of transfers and taxes) or by the income shares of the five income quantiles for a sample of 159 
countries, 1980-2012, and controlling for time and country fixed effects, the authors find a strong 
negative association between the inequality measures and growth. Specifically, if the income 
share of the top (bottom) quintile increases by one percentage point, GDP growth declines 
(rises) by 0.08 (0.38) percentage point. (The equation is estimated using system generalized 
method of moments, which procedure tackles endogeneity problems with RHS variables, while 
the time and country fixed effects control for common shocks and time-invariant country specific 
effects.) The coefficient estimates for the second and third quintiles are also positive. Observe 
that the reported negative implications of rising inequality for growth are not unique to this study 
(see, for example, Berg et al. 2012; OECD 2014). 
What are the mechanisms underpinning this inverse relation between inequality and 
growth? They are said to be fourfold. First, greater inequality impacts investments in health and 
human capital, with knock-on inter-generational effects. Second, inequality harms short-and 
long term growth through a causal effect on crises. This instability may also come about by 
damaging trust and social cohesion. Third, rising inequality can frustrate economic liberalization. 
Fourth, inequality makes it more difficult to reduce poverty via growth.   
Dabla-Norris et al. model the determinants of the Gini coefficients (Net and Market) and 
income shares (top and bottom income deciles as well as the fifth decile) using five year panels 
of data for 1980-2012. In additional to trade, technology, health, government spending, financial 
arguments, and the skill premium, the authors also deploy a decline-in-labor-market institutions 
or rising flexibilities index. An easing of labor market regulations is reported to be associated 
with rising market inequality and is accompanied by rising (falling) share of top (bottom) income 
deciles.  But since (refined) labor variables are the focus of more detailed inquiry in Jaumotte 
and Osorio-Buitron (2015), we remit further discussion of this result till later.  
Unions and Inequality 
Detailed country studies have basically confirmed the result that unions narrow earnings 
dispersion and that union decline has led to increases in inequality even if, as we shall see, 
such results are subject to qualification.The union effect on the wage distribution arises from two 
distinct effects. The within-sector effect is negative because of wage standardization between 
within and across firms and the tendency for unions to reduce the wage gap between blue-collar 
and more highly paid white-collar groups. The between-sector effect widens inequality via the 
union wage premium. Early work by Freeman (1993) for the United States established – quite 
contrary to prior orthodoxy – that unions narrowed the male wage distribution and declining 
unionization widened it significantly between 1978 and 1988. Since then improved studies using 
reweighting approaches to recover the counterfactual wage distribution that would have 
obtained had the workforce composition remained unchanged (see DiNardo et al. 1996) have 
examined the union wage effect across different types of worker and sought to control for 
unobserved skill differences (that contribute toward a compression in worker skills in the union 
sector).  
Comparative second generation studies of this type have been conducted by Card et al. 
(2003, 2004). The authors investigate unions and wage inequality in the United States, the 
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United Kingdom, and Canada – countries in which there is perhaps the clearest distinction 
between the union and non-union sectors – since the early 1980s. Their main findings are as 
follows. First, unions tend to reduce inequality in all three countries among male workers for 
whom the within-sector effect dominates the between-sector effect. Second, controlling for 
worker quality reduces both effects, as union workers are more skilled on average and more 
homogeneous than non-union workers. Third, union coverage tends to be concentrated in the 
middle of the male skill distribution and union wages tend to be compressed vis-à-vis non-union 
wages. Fourth, for this sample, unions do not reduce wage inequality among females because 
(a) women unlike men are concentrated in the upper end of the wage distribution, and (b) the 
union wage premium is not only greater for women but also greater for higher skilled women. 
Finally, the decline in density and the wage differential observed for all three countries has 
resulted in a steady decline in the equalizing effect of unions.   
If the size of the union sector and absence of extension mechanisms in these three 
countries makes it easier it to compare the structure of wages for workers whose wages are 
determined by union contracts and those whose wages are not, other-country studies have 
nevertheless confirmed the same basic tendencies. Thus, evidence for Germany also indicates 
that part of the increase in inequality can be attributed to declining unionization. Dustmann et al. 
(2009), building on micro studies indicating strong evidence that unions compress the wage 
structure and particularly at the lower end of the wage distribution (e.g. Fitzenberger et al. 
2013), report that that the decline in union recognition between 1995 and 2005 had a material, if 
not dominant, effect on the wage structure. Specifically, they find that deunionization can 
account for 28 percent of the increase in the 50-15 percentile wage gap, and 13 percent of 85-
50 percentile gap. In other words, the effect of union decline was felt most at lower reaches of 
the wage distribution. 
More recent research by Dustman et al. (2014) links rising inequality to the 
decentralization of collective bargaining and not simply to the decline in unionization (but see 
below).  Specifically, the authors examine wage growth by the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentiles of 
the wage distribution. It is found that wage inequality in the covered sector grew at the bottom 
and at the top of the wage distribution (whereas in the uncovered sector it was confined to the 
top of the wage distribution). The change in wage inequality in the covered sector is loosely 
attributed to decentralized wage setting, and in particular to the growth in opening clauses after 
1995. The argument is prima facie consistent with other research pointing to the increasing role 
of firm-level differences in wages as a source rising German wage inequality (e.g. Card et al. 
2013). 
The most recent attempt to investigate the effect of unionism (and other labor market 
institutions) on income inequality is that of Jaumotte and Osorio-Buitron (2015), who look at the 
experience of some 20 advanced economies from the early 1980s to 2010. Their event study 
and panel regression analyses suggest that the decline in union density is related to the rise of 
income inequality at the top of the income distribution. This not uncontroversial result is 
conjectured to reflect an implicit increase in the bargaining power of top earners with the 
reduction in that of average wage earners and also a more limited worker influence on 
redistributive policies.  
Focusing here on the authors’ panel regression analysis, Jaumotte and Osorio-Buitron 
first regress two measures of gross income inequality (namely the top 10 percent income share 
and the Gini coefficient of gross income) on labor market institutions. The controls in addition to 
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country and time fixed effects comprise technology, globalization, an index of financial reform, 
the top marginal tax rate and a banking crisis variable. The labor market institutions are union 
density, excess collective bargaining coverage (viz. coverage less density), the value of the 
minimum wage in relation to the median wage, the first-year gross unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, and a measure of the employment protection afforded regular and temporary 
employment contracts. A separate regression analysis of the Gini coefficient of net income 
inequality is also provided in which a key RHS variable is the Gini coefficient of gross income; 
the other arguments being a subset of those considered earlier. In each case, a benchmark 
equation is run containing all the controls plus union density (and the minimum wage). Next, the 
estimating equation is augmented by an excess collective bargaining coverage variable. Finally, 
the rest of the labor market arguments are added (and excess collective bargaining coverage 
dropped).  
For gross inequality it is found that a weakening of unions is associated with an increase 
in the top 10 percent income share, while its association with the Gini coefficient of gross 
income is also negative. Specifically, in the baseline equation, a 10 percent decline in union 
density is associated with a 5 percent increase in the top 10 percent income share. Interestingly, 
in the first augmentation, excess bargaining coverage is positively associated with inequality 
while the union density coefficient estimate is basically unchanged. Finally, the impact of density 
is also unaffected by the inclusion of the other labor market institutions, the role of which is not 
commented upon here. 
As for the determinants of redistribution, apart from the result that the coefficient 
estimate of the Gini of gross income is less than unity, which indicates the impact of 
redistribution, the role of union density is again negative and well determined. The suggestion 
is, then, that unions influence redistribution which role has therefore been reduced in the wake 
of their decline. 
Given the rather surprising results of this study – after all the orthodox view is that 
changes in unionism affect middle- and lower-income workers – Jaumotte and Osorio-Buitron 
embark on an exhaustive series of robustness checks. These include controlling for sectoral 
shifts/deindustrialization, skill biased technical change, social preferences in favor of greater 
inequality, the role of the finance sector, rising levels of formal schooling, and even the 
endogeneity of the union variable.19 In each case, the union argument proved robust, actually 
increasing in absolute magnitude vis-à-vis the benchmark equation. Interestingly, the authors 
also regressed union density on separate (net) income decile shares, using the same controls 
as the baseline equation, yielding familiar results for the lower ranges of the income distribution. 
That is to say, the union density coefficient estimates were positive for the bottom seven deciles 
indicating the familiar result that union decline harms a wide swathe of middle- and lower-
income earners. But, as before, the density coefficient estimate in the case of the top decile was 
negative; it was also considerably larger in absolute magnitude.  
Now all such results are subject to qualification. For example, in charting the effects of 
the decline in British unionism between 1983 and 1995, Addison et al. (2007) report that 
deunionization accounts for surprisingly little (under 5 percent) of the increase in earnings 
dispersion in the private sector for both males and females. In both cases, standardization 
effects largely offset a decline in density and a shift in membership towards the more skilled. In 
the public sector, however, there has also occurred a profound shift in organization toward more 
skilled workers, especially among females. This meant that a much smaller decline in 
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unionization accounted for between 30 and 40 percent of the increase in dispersion, which 
effect is of course more properly to be construed as “re-unionization.”  
The theme that unions have come to organize better-paid workers is taken up in the final 
study considered here. Pontusson (2013) examines the association between unionization, 
inequality, and redistributive government policies in a sample of OECD countries from 1975 to 
the present. Over the interval 1975-95, Pontusson observes that countries that witnessed 
relatively large declines in unionization also experienced relatively large increases in earnings 
inequality, as measured by changes in the 90:10 earnings ratio. Since 1995, however, no such 
association is evident in the data.  He then examines the link between changes in redistribution 
(measured by the percentage change in the Gini coefficient produced by taxation and income 
transfers) and changes in union density. A regression of the change in redistribution on the 
change in union density – controlling for the initial level of redistribution, or catch up, and 
inequality-induced redistribution captured by the change in the Gini coefficient for market 
income – yields a positive and statistically significant effect of unionism for the sample period 
1980-95. Over this interval, increasing unionism thus seems to have exerted pressure on 
governments to redistribute, and conversely. For the period 1995-2010, however, the coefficient 
estimate for the change in union density is negative and statistically insignificant, suggesting 
that changes in union density were no longer linked to redistribution.  
Pontusson thus argues that the egalitarian effects of unionization – for government-led 
redistribution and the distribution of earnings from employment – have diminished over the past 
two decades. By way of explanation, he finds that the material decline in union density in many 
OECD nations since the 1970s has been accompanied by important changes in the position of 
union members in household income distribution. In a clear majority of OECD countries 
examined, union density peaks in either the fourth of fifth quintiles. Pontusson’s conclusion that 
the average union member has become better off as union density has declined and that union 
members have become less supportive of wage solidarity and redistributive policies is 
suggestive rather than definitive but it provides an interesting point of contact with Jaumotte and 
Osorio-Buitron who, in support of their findings as to the impact of deunionization on top income 
shares, might argue that this in part resulted from weak unions having lost their voice in the 
public policy debate on redistributive policies as well as on policies that affect market income 
inequality.  
There are at least three remaining issues. The first is the question of how equalizing is 
equalizing. The second is the related issue of the efficiency of equalization. The third, is the 
vexed question of decentralization versus deunionization. First of all, cross-country data from 
the 1970s to the 1990s on collective bargaining coverage, earnings inequality, and 
unemployment assembled by Pencavel (2005: 71-74) suggests that unions in continental 
Europe may have helped to prevent wage inequality albeit largely at the expense of greater 
unemployment (see also Boeri 2015). His explanation is that unions have improved the wage 
position of the lower to middle skilled groups that have been most impacted by the shift toward 
more competitive product markets produced by heightened trade, increased factor mobility, and 
technological change. However, as a referee reminds us, this is an over generalization in that it 
fails to recognize that unions in a number of countries – examples would include Austria, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark – have actively sought to reverse wage policies that have had this 
effect.  
38 
 
Second of all, pay compression can have positive and negative effects on efficiency. The 
case is nicely illustrated by Flanagan (2003: 182) who distinguishes between two types of equal 
pay pursued historically under the old solidaristic wage policies of Swedish unions. One such 
policy was ‘equal pay for equal work’ practised in the mid-1950s, and the other was ‘equal pay 
for unequal work’ that followed in the late 1960s. Flanagan shows that a policy eliminating inter-
establishment and inter-industry wage differentials can raise productivity growth by accelerating 
job destruction in relatively inefficient (older) plants and by stimulating job creation in new, more 
efficient plants. On the other hand, equal pay for unequal work detracts from productivity 
growth; for example, by reducing the incentives to acquire human capital. 
Third of all, even if deunionization leading to individual bargaining of employers with their 
employees may be regarded as the ultimate form of decentralization it is clearly not what is 
meant by the decentralization of collective bargaining, although the two are linked under 
disorganized decentralization based an erosion of multi-employer bargaining. We know of no 
real attempt to unpick the component magnitudes. Most of the research on inequality has simply 
focused on the decline in union density or coverage. Perhaps the main exception is the 
diagnosis of widening income inequality in Germany by Dustmann et al. (2014), briefly reviewed 
earlier, in which earnings dispersion within the covered sector is examined alongside that of the 
uncovered sector, and not simply linked to declining overall density. These authors attribute the 
dramatic turnaround in German competitiveness to unit cost reduction made possible by 
deunionization on the one hand and by the decentralization of collective bargaining (opening 
clauses) on the other. As a result, so the argument runs, German unemployment barely budged 
during the Great Recession, reflecting the specific governance structure of German labor 
market institutions that enabled them to react flexibly in a time of extraordinary economic 
circumstances. But the authors do not identify the contribution of decentralization. 
6 A caveat: collective bargaining systems and other 
institutions  
This review has neglected the interplay between collective bargaining systems and other labor 
market institutions, other than having made reference to the elevated unemployment effect of 
the tax wedge in countries with liberal extension procedures and other such interactions in the 
distinct strikes literature. However, as the OECD (2004: 165) has observed, “the impact of the 
organization of collective bargaining on labor market performance appears to be contingent 
upon other institutional or policy factors and these interactions need to be clarified to provide 
robust policy advice.” And indeed in estimating unemployment equations inter al. the pre-crisis 
macro literature did allow for interactions between collective bargaining and other labor market 
institutions. Clearly in assessing the effects of the new institutional developments charted here – 
of which the most important is decentralization – this interplay needs to be modeled. Thus, for 
example, in the presence of multiple objectives (e.g. efficiency and equity) decentralization may 
offer efficiency gains at the expense of equity. In such circumstances, it makes sense to 
consider other tools to mitigate or confront the problem. Again, experience might suggest that 
other well-designed institutions may facilitate the political economy of reforms to the collective 
bargaining system. Thus, flexicurity programs on the Danish pattern might help alleviate worker 
concerns over more flexible wage setting systems. In considering the design of an appropriate 
collective bargaining system, then, the limitations of our focus upon any single ‘tool’ has to be 
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kept in mind. But first the changes in collective bargaining documented here await formal 
expression in macro models.   
7 Conclusions 
Although one has to be especially careful when discussing existing structures of collective 
bargaining by reason of their manifest diversity and continuing evolution, the trend towards 
decentralization, although not outright convergence, seems incontrovertible. The economic 
reasons for that decentralization also seem uncontroversial. The evidence suggests that what is 
needed for efficiency is a collective bargaining system that allows for local adjustment while 
retaining coordination to facilitate macroeconomic adjustment. This requirement covers a 
multitude of sins of course since there are numerous forms of adjustment to local circumstances 
and coordination. One option is the new Scandinavian model of industry bargaining with 
articulation, where local bargaining controls much more of overall earnings that are increasingly 
determined by performance and which contain an individualized component. Another option is 
sectoral bargaining at branch level accompanied by works agreements on the German pattern 
(i.e. between management and works councils). These would presumably involve the 
application of opt out clauses that might be expected over time to morph into pacts for 
employment and competitiveness. Integrative bargaining at local level is ultimately the key. The 
German system in principle allows works agreements to focus upon issues of production rather 
than distribution and may be more appealing theoretically. It may also be viewed as more 
exportable than the Scandinavian model for sectoral bargaining systems with weak unions. It 
may even be more appealing given contemporary (Swedish) unemployment rates. The latter 
might also serve to refocus attention on the Anglo-Saxon model from the perspective of micro 
and macro flexibility, since there is the suggestion that micro flexibility in the U.K. has arguably 
facilitated macro flexibility (but see below).  
We have also suggested that trust among the social partners may be just as important 
as structures in bringing about macro flexibility in making a case for the polder model. Trust at 
the micro level is no less important, and it may also have a bearing on the performance of 
models. Two examples are instructive here. First, Marsden (2015) has contrasted work systems 
in Britain and Germany. He contends that although British employers have re-established 
control over the work process in manufacturing, after the dark days of the 1960s to the 1980s, 
they have (often) done so by ensuring that workers remain easily substitutable so that the 
dismissal threat remains credible. There results a hierarchical model relying on managerial 
control, and a so-called lean model of work organization. By contrast, the German dual system 
uses high performance work systems that involve flexible working and on-the-job problem-
solving, maintaining high degrees of worker autonomy in a learning model of work organization 
(recall Box A). German firms in consequence have not had to sacrifice skill assets though 
narrow jobs and restricted worker flexibility and knowledge. The learning model has been 
facilitated by separating wage-setting responsibility from that for workplace issues under the 
dual system. As a result, line managers have not been able to use pay as a resource to get 
employees to accept line assignments, while for their part individual workers and work groups 
could not make their acceptance conditional on doing a deal with their manager. Marsden 
argues that, by dividing areas of employee influence in this way, the German system has been 
able to provide sufficient voice to sustain cooperation while making it harder to use strength in 
one area to support demands in another.  
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A second example is provided by Nienhueser and Hossfeld’s (2011) case study which 
examines the trust between works councilors and managers in Germany and how this affects 
their preferences for plant-level negotiations as compared with industry-wide or multi-employer 
bargaining. Nienhueser and Hossfeld anticipated that mutual trust would be manifested in both 
parties having a preference for plant bargaining. Their descriptive analysis duly confirmed the 
very high degree of trust in the respective bargaining partners. However, the authors’ regression 
analysis produced no evidence that trust affected management’s already strong preferences for 
decentralized bargaining.  For works councilors whose preferences for decentralized bargaining 
were very much lower than those of management to begin with, it was found that low trust 
strongly reinforced that less favorable view of decentralization.  
It follows that the role of trust and its interaction with the institutions of collective 
bargaining needs to be accorded greater attention in research. Focusing here on a line of 
causation running from collective bargaining to trust, the design features of collective bargaining 
systems that could potentially help build up trust would include built-in incentives to continue 
bargaining rather than walking away in the case of failure, government involvement, and long-
term contracting. On this basis, we would (also) adduce support for the polder or Dutch model. 
We have also had occasion to examine extension agreements that support sectoral 
bargaining by making it less risky for employers to sign such agreements. Whatever the 
usefulness of extensions in this regard, our discussion has suggested that the cost of automatic 
extension may be severe. Allowing firms in difficulty to opt-out and exempting the long-term 
unemployed would be obvious temporary palliatives. Carefully refining thresholds to ensure that 
the bargaining parties represent a majority of employers and employees in the industry would 
be a more thorough-going means of reducing the costs of these ordinances. One nagging issue 
that remains, however, is the role of ordinances in stimulating the informal sector. 
Some final issues are associated with deunionization. The first is the impact of union 
decline on wage and income inequality. Causality (in the absence of fully-fledged general 
equilibrium analysis, inter al.) is arguably less of an issue here than the magnitude of the union 
effect. Measurement is important not least because a recent research literature has provided 
concrete evidence that increases in inequality retard growth. In any event, extant findings do not 
admit of obvious policy solutions in the form of more unionization or higher minimum wages. 
Thus, the gamut of (adverse) welfare consequences of union actions in times of stronger 
unionism have to be considered while minimum wages can harm low-skill groups and result in a 
loss in competitiveness. And although the inequality issue is unlikely to go away, other 
determinants of rising inequality may be more important as well as more tractable components 
of any reform agenda. There is also the issue of the role of decentralization in this regard. 
Arguably, disorganized decentralization is the link. That said, even organized decentralization 
may coexist with a shrinking core, with not dissimilar implications for the wage distribution.  
But might it not be claimed that declining unionism has caused an unambiguous shortfall 
in worker voice, the provision of we have argued to be critical for microeconomic flexibility? If a 
prima facie case does exist for measures supportive of voice, the downside is the growth in 
bargaining power attendant upon measures favoring increased worker representation. The 
bargaining problem means that employers can be expected to vest voice institutions with too 
little power. This returns us to the appeal of the German model and method of workplace 
representation because of the practical limits placed on rent seeking by the works council, 
including a peace obligation. Indeed, we earlier conjectured that a German-like system may 
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allow a decoupling of the factors that determine the size of the joint surplus of an establishment 
from the factors that determine its distribution.  
As a practical matter, there are indications that outside the United States where the 
Wagner Act has undoubtedly had a chilling influence and may well require reform,20 non-union 
voice has increased. For example, the most recent research for Britain finds that the decline in 
union voice has been accompanied by a dramatic expansion in non-union voice, such that the 
overall coverage of voice mechanisms has remained high and stable (Bryson et al. 2013). Thus, 
British employers have seemingly chosen non-union voice rather than opt for no voice at all. 
Moreover, comparing voice regimes, non-union voice is reported to have outperformed union 
voice for a variety of subjectively defined measures (industrial relations climate, productivity, 
and financial performance – if not quits), while there is also greater use of human resource 
management practices under non-union voice. These results give credence to the notion that 
management has had an incentive to invest in non-union voice, although this conclusion is 
subject to interpretation partly because of the joint use of both channels.  Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, the efficacy of non-union versus union voice remains the subject of continuing debate. 
  
 
Box A 
Micro foundations of trust: the German model 
It has recently been argued that the continuing endurance of the German model owes much to 
trust. In particular, Marsden (2015) contends that this is underscored by the presence in some 
but by no means all sectors of a high discretion learning model of work organization, which he 
contrasts with the more managerial-directed lean model in Britain. He claims that German 
manufacturers have been successful in repositioning themselves within international supply 
chains (and the so-called trade in tasks) as reflected in a rising share of exports in 
manufacturing gross value added. The idea is that holding one’s place in international supply 
chains is very competitive, requiring firms to attain quality standards needed for the final product 
in the chain while being innovative in managing process and cost improvements. The work 
practices of German firms, so the argument runs, have kept pace with these changes via 
learning-based work systems. In Germany a strong foundation of intermediate skills is said to 
provide an effective basis for this particular model, the hallmark of which is task flexibility and 
on-the-job learning, or high performance work systems in short. (The alternative works systems, 
in addition to the lean model mentioned earlier, are the Taylor approach and the craft/simple 
model.)  Marsden develops a model in which stable cooperation with the learning model is 
enhanced via a strong institutional framework. This is because of the need for ‘goodwill 
cooperation’ in employment relationships founded on incomplete contract and reliance 
investments. The German industrial relations system has provided the necessary institutional 
support, which is why employers in sectors using the learning model have continued to work 
with the institutions of codetermination that encourage the expression of voice. Both individual 
voice and collective voice are important and Marsden argues that these are complements when 
collective voice exists as of right. Mutual goodwill requires stability, meaning that faster 
adjustment to economic shocks can potentially strain relationships of mutual trust. Alternatively 
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expressed, the learning model may be difficult to sustain if the institutional support that currently 
involves a sharing of firms’ and workers’ economic risks and adjustment costs more widely, with 
other firms, other workers, and the state, is undermined. Marsden also contends that the 
partitioning of the dual system – where the responsibility for wage bargaining is separated from 
workplace issues, being assigned to unions and works councils respectively – has provided 
support for cooperation while at the same time making it harder to use strength in one area to 
support demands in another. He cautions that this partitioning is jeopardized by the erosion in 
the coverage of collective agreements. 
 
Box B 
The costs of extension agreements: the ‘unhappy’ cases of 
Portugal and Spain 
Two recent studies have sought to examine the costs of extension arrangements for two 
countries recording among the greatest disparities between union density and coverage, namely 
Portugal and Spain. Beginning with Portugal, Martins (2014) evaluates the impact of extensions 
in terms of the employment and wage bills of the affected sectors using a difference-in-
differences approach. Employment equations for the sample period 2007-2011 are estimated. 
Specifically, industry employment is regressed on a dummy variable for extensions (set equal to 
1 in the first four months after the extension of the collective agreement in that industry comes 
into force, 0 otherwise), controlling for industry and time fixed effects. In addition to employment, 
Martins presents corresponding regressions for hires, separations, and the wage bill.  He 
reports that the average number of workers employed in an industry falls by 2 percent in the 
four months following an extension. The employment result is produced by a fall in new hires of 
4 percent, while separations are unaffected. In sharp contrast, service providers for the industry 
from the informal sector – and as such not subject to the extensions’ wage floors or indeed any 
other rules of the labor code – see their employment rise by 1.4 percent. The latter increase falls 
well short of that required to match the loss of formal employment, noted earlier. The total wage 
bill falls on average by 2.2 percent following extensions.  
Moreover, Martins shows that his results are robust to more detailed timing effects, different 
ways of controlling for time differences, firm types (although small firms with less than 10 
employees record higher employment losses of 2.6 percent) and broad sector, and alternative 
counterfactuals. He also conducts a falsification test based on extensions that were announced 
but not implemented. He finds that only those extensions that become legally binding have 
negative employment effects. The bottom line of this study of almost 30,000 de facto minimum 
wages – one for each main job in each industry – is sobering, namely a fall in sectoral 
employment and wage bills of 2 percent and a growth in segmentation. 
Another very recent study investigating sectoral wage contracts that are automatically extended 
provides corroboratory evidence on disemployment costs for Spain. Díez-Catalán and 
Villanueva (2014) examine contracts signed immediately before and immediately after the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, an event presaging a large and 
unexpected drop in economic activity. They report that the former wage increases exceeded the 
latter by 1 percentage point. This wage adjustment happened within industries and provinces 
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given the regional nature of collective bargaining in Spain. Some two years after this event 
workers in firms covered by the earlier contracts had a 1 percentage point greater probability of 
being unemployed than their counterparts covered by the later contracts.  
Matching  information on collective contracts with longitudinal data from a four percent sample 
of Spanish Social Security records, and selecting those whose wages grew most – individuals 
whose monthly earnings in December 2007 were at most 1.2 times the minimum wage in the 
agreement – it was found that the differential increase in the probability of not working in March 
2009 among workers whose collective contract was signed before the Lehman bankruptcy 
fluctuated between 3 and 4 percent in late 2010. The wage increase among job stayers with 
wages close to the minimum was 2.86 percent. Vulgo: earnings losses among those who lost 
their jobs offset the wage gains of those who remained in work.  
 
Box C 
Decentralization and economic outcomes: two case studies 
for Germany 
(a)  Opening clauses and employment 
Brändle and Heinbach (2013) see opening clauses as a means of arresting the decline in 
coverage and increasing employment in covered firms. Specifically, they argue that opening 
clauses allow employers to reduce wages in the event of negative shocks, with different effects 
on job flows according to whether the clauses are applied. For firms applying such clauses, job 
destruction should decline on account of their being able to retain a larger number of employees 
and, to the extent that they reduce job creation with improvements in the economy, their job 
reallocation rates should be lower. On the other hand, firms not applying opening clauses could 
increase job creation in anticipation of their increased flexibility and if the economic situation 
worsens be able to avoid job destruction. On balance, the economy should register higher job 
growth by virtue of improved decision making on the part of firms.  
To investigate the employment issue, the authors use information on opening clauses from the 
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IAW) Data Set on Opening Clauses and the IAB 
Establishment Panel, 2000-2007. The outcome indicators examined are job flows: job creation, 
job destruction, job reallocation (viz. the sum of job destruction and creation), and job growth. 
As a first step, the authors use propensity score matching to control for selectivity bias, and 
thence measure the average treatment effect on the treated observations, conditional on the 
respective propensity scores, to identify the effect of opening clauses on job flows. 
It is reported that establishments whose collective bargaining agreements contain opening 
clauses have lower job reallocation rates, lower job destruction rates, and higher job growth 
rates – only job creation is unaffected by opening clauses. It is argued that the lower job 
destruction rates indicate that opening clauses fulfill their objective of giving firms more flexibility 
to save jobs in harsh economic times, even if establishments do not appear to anticipate the 
increased flexibility (i.e. by hiring a larger number of workers). 
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The authors then test the latter argument by examining the effect of knowledge of opening 
clauses on job flows. Explicit knowledge of opening clauses is shown not to affect job flows and 
the job growth rate remains statistically insignificant, leading the authors to conclude that 
establishments do not gain more flexibility from opening clauses – or perhaps already have 
enough flexibility as might be the case if they pay above the bargained wage.  
Finally, they consider job flows in establishments that actually apply opening clauses as 
opposed to simply having such clauses in their framework agreements. There is no indication 
that job flows are significantly impacted; that is, although the existence of opening clause seems 
to reduce job destruction rates, the application of opening clauses shows no additional effects. 
The authors speculate that this may reflect the role of the works council since the application of 
such clauses is secured through negotiation with that entity. As a practical matter, however, 
opening clauses are also applied in establishments without works councils. A recent study by 
Ellguth et al. (2014) of opening clauses using the 2005 and 2007 waves of the IAB 
Establishment Panel, sheds further light on this issue. They report that (a) the existence of 
opening clauses is associated with higher wages (a sort of quasi-insurance premium) while (b) 
their application results in wage cuts of approximately similar magnitude that (c) works council 
establishments are able to resist. 
(b) Pacts, employment, wages, investment, labor productivity, 
innovation, and business survival 
The existing literature on pacts for employment and competitiveness presents a mixed picture 
largely restricted to employment effects. A recent study by Addison et al. (2015) investigates the 
association between pacts and a much wider range of outcomes, namely wages, productivity, 
innovation, and survivability in addition to employment. Using data from the IAB Establishment 
Panel for the core interval 2006-2009, the authors compare outcomes in establishments that 
successfully negotiated such agreements with those plants where the outcome of negotiations 
was unsuccessful. The assumption made is that the negotiation outcome is equally uncertain on 
the left and right margins of the decision threshold since the data do not contain information (i.e. 
‘votes’) that would enable us to determine whether those establishments with pacts were 
actually on the brink of not signing an agreement and whether those that failed to sign a pact 
having begun negotiations were sufficiently close to signing an agreement. Indicative regression 
results for 1-,2-, and 3-year treatment effects are reported for four different specifications of the 
model are provided assuming local randomization are provided. Abstracting from results for the 
baseline specification, in 10 out of 45 cases the estimated pact coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant while in the remaining cases one cannot exclude a zero impact on 
performance. For the preferred specification, there are three key findings: first, a two-year effect 
of about 8 percent in an establishment’s average wage; second, a three-year effect on 
establishment productivity of approximately 20 percent; and, third, a one-year effect on 
innovative activity of some 11 percent.  
In the first of two robustness checks, the authors randomize participation of ‘individuals’ in the 
treatment and control groups. They next assign a random sampling probability to each unit in 
the original treatment and control groups, followed by a weighted regression in which the 
weights are given by the inverse of the allocated probability. The authors’ simulations are 
centered around the point estimates for the key outcome indicators. In other words, higher 
wages, enhanced productivity, and improved innovation survive the robustness checks. The 
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bottom line is that pacts seemingly fulfill an integrative bargaining function and are to be 
distinguished from old-style concession bargaining.  
 
Endnotes 
1To gauge whether these results might instead be picking up cross-country (as opposed 
to firm specific results), the probit regressions are rerun for separate samples of countries 
according to whether their collective agreement coverage is high or low. It is found that, with the 
exception of the coverage variable, the results reported above reflect within-country rather than 
cross-country differences. 
2More broadly based cooperation also receives emphasis in the new view of unions. 
That is, Freeman and Medoff emphasize the importance of the quality of labor relations. They 
state explicitly that good labor relations are more likely to produce positive performance 
outcomes, whereas highly antagonistic relationships or forms of bad labor relations can lead to 
adverse performance effects. Formally last in the Freeman-Medoff scheme of things is the 
shock administered by unions, and union wages, to inefficient management, providing it with the 
incentive to tighten up on work standards and alter methods of production.  
3While Dinardo and Lee also report that unionism has no effect on hours of work a 
recent study of nursing homes by Sojourner et al. (2012), using the same regression 
discontinuity design, finds that hours of work, as a proxy for employment, decline precipitously 
as a result of union certification in representation elections. 
4Although a more recent study by Bryson, Forth, and Laroche (2011) concludes that 
British unions still do depress firm profitability where there is active collective bargaining. This 
study also reports not dissimilar results for France if union density is high or where unions have 
a reputation for militancy.  
5While the decline in British union density over this period may be ascribed in part to 
globalization, the U.K. is unique in that six major pieces of legislation designed to address union 
power were introduced by successive Conservative administrations between 1980 and 1993 
(see Addison and Siebert 2003). These reforms were accompanied by the abolition of exchange 
controls,  the dismantling of statutory wage fixing machinery, a sustained program of 
privatization of the nationalized (and notably heavily unionized industries), and deregulation. 
There can be no doubt that the union reforms independently hit union density (e.g. Freeman 
and Pelletier 1990) and also little  disagreement that they lie behind the changes in the micro 
performance outcomes noted earlier. 
6This linear relation between performance and the degree of centralization is often 
loosely referred to as the corporatist thesis. Given that corporatism incorporates the effects of 
the political environment on the macroeconomic effects of collective bargaining, and given the 
imprecision of the models used (see Flanagan 2003: 185), we elect to largely confine our 
discussion of corporatist notions to the consideration of social pacts or alliances involving the 
bargaining parties/social partners and the government (see section 4). However, mention 
should be made here of the institutionalized corporatist model of Teulings and Hartog (1998) 
because of its contract-theoretic roots and incorporation of flexibility. As noted earlier, the 
mechanism through which corporatism achieves allocative efficiency in this framework is via the 
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setting of ex ante binding contracts that obviate the need for inefficient ex post recontracting 
(once surpluses have been created). Rigid nominal contracts are therefore given a positive 
efficiency role. The basic model builds upon monopsonistic wage setting and a hold-up model of 
investments. In this setting, wage differentials stem from surpluses and these rents are said to 
be smaller in corporatist economies, the maintained hypothesis being that rent sharing is likely 
even in the absence of unions. Corporatism reduces the variance in wages that result from 
different processes and union policies. Given an aggregate demand shock, as opposed to 
shocks that are particular to each firm and ‘absorbed,’ nominal wage contracts are not adjusted 
locally. Rather, the corporatist institutions coordinate adjustments to these shocks. Corporatist 
coordination is said to be superior to mechanical adjustment rules because the latter cannot 
take all contingencies into account. In testing the model, wage differentials are taken as the key 
indicator of the efficiency of labor market processes, with corporatist economies displaying 
smaller non-competitive differentials than their more market-oriented counterparts. 
Unfortunately, in addition to eschewing consideration of wages/changes in wages, the model 
does not directly tackle unemployment either. Explanation of the latter is simply laid at the door 
of the social security system. Nonetheless, an enduring contribution of this model is the notion 
that institutional structures have an historical and social context, their interdependence once 
again suggesting that what works in one economy may not work in another.  
7But see Ochel (2005: 105-106).  
8The sources of oversimplification are twofold. First, we have neglected research 
investigating potential interactions between labor market policies and the institutional features of 
the collective bargaining system (on the effects of which, see inter al. OECD 2004; Elmeskov et 
al. 1998; Belot and van Ours 2004). Second, we have ignored work on interactions between 
collective bargaining and monetary and fiscal policy, such as that between coordinated wage 
bargaining and central bank independence (for a compact survey of which, see Aidt and 
Tzannatos 2008: 286-290). 
9Using data from the ICTWSS Database on 25 European countries (adding Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the countries 
shown in Table 1) for the years 2000-2009, Visser (2013: 16) obtains a simple correlation 
coefficient of r=0.80 between the level of employer organization (ranked as 
strong/medium/weak) and the bargaining coverage rate. The corresponding correlation 
coefficient between coverage and union density is r=0.50. See also Vissser (2016: 9-11). His 
broader conclusion, however, is that coverage rates and employer organization move together 
rather than the latter causing the former. Thus, for example, both may be determined by 
extension procedures. 
10Visser (2016: Table 1) provides indicative estimates of the effect of extension 
agreements in terms of the percentage of employees in employment affected.  
11Decentralization has also been shaped by the state. The best known cases of state 
intervention are those in Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain during the Great Recession. Much 
earlier, the locus of bargaining shifted from industry level to the enterprise level in France, 
beginning in 1982/83 when a duty to bargain (over changes in hours) first became obligatory 
and at the same time direct employee representation was established at workplace level. 
Thence, successive governments are described by Visser (2016: 19) as having “promoted the 
enterprise as a conduit for public policy exceptions, further enhancing the autonomy of the 
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enterprise from the wider industrial relations system, together with a relocation of employee 
representation from the trade union to the non-union, firm-specific institutions in all but the 
largest firms.”  
12 In not dissimilar fashion, pattern bargaining may be supported by other institutions, 
such as conflict resolution procedures in Norway and Denmark where it is possible to end 
disputes over the renewal of agreements by means of a single mediation procedure for the 
entire sector, the mediator being empowered to treat several settlements as a single entity in 
the ballot. As Visser (2013: 61) notes, mediation can serve as a strong centralizing force in an 
otherwise decentralized system (viz. Denmark) or to contain ‘unruly’ unions/employers 
(Norway).   
13Namely, the elasticity of total revenue with respect to changes in employment, the 
productivity of insiders relative to  outsiders, the weight of outsiders relative to insiders in union 
utility, the weight of wages relative to employment in union utility, and the real alternative 
income level.  
14That is, they recognize that other considerations may affect the relative outcomes of 
the two bargaining modes even if they are deemed rather ‘fussy’ to be approached 
quantitatively.  
15Drawing on data from the Wage Dynamics Network (see section 2), Boeri provides five 
pieces of evidence in support of his critique. First, he reports that there does not seem to be any 
strong bias in favor of insiders at plant level as compared with two-tier bargaining. Second, labor 
costs as a share of total costs are significantly higher in companies practicing two-tier 
bargaining. Third, two-tier structures provide significantly less performance-related pay than 
other bargaining forms, and especially plant-level bargaining. Fourth, the labor costs of 
countries with two-tier structures (identified as Austria, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and 
Portugal) have failed to deliver moderation in unit labor cost development vis-à-vis Germany, 
2000-2013. Finally, he contends that there is little evidence on adjustment mechanisms to 
suggest that two-tier bargaining can better cope with aggregate shocks. Boeri therefore 
concludes that two-tier structures do not allow for micro flexibility in wage setting, employment, 
and hours adjustment that decentralization under two-tier bargaining was supposed to achieve. 
The problem is that in his consideration of regimes  Boeri again risks putting too much into one 
basket. 
16In his discussion of pattern bargaining in Austria, Traxler (1998) earlier identified the 
metal engineering group in the exposed sector as setting the pattern and internalizing the 
externalities by setting rates below the metalworking industry’s own productivity increase. But 
Visser (2016: 27) questions whether this will continue in the future following the decision in 2012 
of the employers making up the six constituent parts of that sector going their own way and 
signing separate agreements, comparable with the situation in Sweden after 1983 and until the 
late 1990s when pattern bargaining was contested.  
17That said, the authors contend that decentralization has the more deleterious short-
term effects. 
18Today, the main union confederations provide annual recommendations on maximum 
wage increases that are a function of past developments in inflation and productivity, and that 
are not exceeded in practice. As a practical matter, wage agreements that have historically set 
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norms for minimum and maximum rates of pay are increasingly giving way to those that set 
minimum rates of pay.  
19The interesting instruments include the five-year cross-country unemployment rate 
interacted with a Ghent dummy (taking the value of 1 where unemployment benefits are 
managed by unions, 0 otherwise). Ghent refers to the provision or administration of 
unemployment insurance (UI) by trade unions. The Ghent system takes the form of either 
voluntary UI funds set up by unions that are subsidized by the state (in Finland, Denmark, and 
Sweden) or as a compulsory UI scheme partly administered by unions (Belgium).  As can be 
seen from Table 1 these countries respectively enjoy the three highest and fifth-highest union 
densities, and this association is confirmed in cet. par. analyses (e.g. Ebbinghaus and 
Visser1999).  
20On a legal reform agenda specific to the United States involving conditional 
deregulation and changes in the labor law default, see Hirsch (2004b). 
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Table 2 The Presence of Company-Level Pacts and Opening Clauses in Germany (in percent of 
employment)
a
 
Year Pactsb 
Opening   
clausesc 
Pacts in 
establishments 
with opening 
clauses 
Opening clauses 
in 
establishments 
bound by a 
collective 
agreement 
Pacts in 
establishments 
bound by a 
collective 
agreement 
Pacts in 
establishments 
without 
collective 
agreements 
Pacts in 
establishments 
using of 
opening clauses 
Use of 
opening 
clauses in 
establishments 
bound by  
collective 
agreements 
Use of  
opening 
clauses in 
establishments 
with opening 
clauses 
2005 31.6 37.2 49.3 43.2 35.3 8.4 59.6 24.1 56.0 
2006 31.0 29.8 57.1 42.2 34.5 7.4 
   
2007 30.1 37.5 45.7 44.9 34.7 6.7 51.2 24.7 55.1 
2008 30.6 30.4 49.0 39.9 35.1 7.4 
   
2009 33.9 29.0 54.8 40.0 38.1 12.9 
   
2010 21.6 47.4 38.9 60.6 25.7 3.5 
   
2011 24.2 50.7 40.2 62.1 28.5 3.8 44.6 48.9 78.8 
2012 24.7 48.4 43.2 62.8 29.3 4.7 
   
2013 27.1 46.5 49.9 61.5 32.0 5.1 
   
Table 1 Changes in Bargaining Coverage and Union Density, 1995-2010, and in Density Since Peak 
        Bargaining coverage (%) 
 
  Union density (%) 
 
   1995 2010 2013a Change 
 
1995 2010  2013a Change Change from Peak 
Austria 98.3 99.0 98.0 0.7 
 
41.1 28.4 27.4 -12.7 -56.8 (1960)b 
Belgium 96.0 96.0 99.0 0.0 
 
55.7 50.6 55.4 -5.1 -9.2 (1995) 
Germany 76.0 61.1 57.6 -15.0 
 
29.2 18.6 17.7 -10.7 -48.3 (1991) 
The 
Netherlands 
82.3 84.3 84.8 2.0 
 
25.7 18.6 17.6 -7.0 -50.8 (1960) 
Switzerland 41.7 49.1 48.6 7.3 
 
22.7 17.2 16.2 -5.5 -52.4 (1960) 
Finland 85.0 89.5 93.0 4.5 
 
80.4 70.0 68.6 -10.5 -13.3 (1993) 
Sweden 94.0 91.0 89.0 -3.0 
 
83.1 68.4 67.7 -14.7 -21.2 (1994) 
Norway 72.0 74.0 66.9 2.0 
 
57.3 54.8 63.5 -2.5 -9.9 (1961) 
Denmark 84.0 85.0 84.0 1.0 
 
77.0 68.5 66.8 -8.4 -24.8 (1987) 
Italy 85.0 85.0 80.0 0.0 
 
38.1 35.5 36.9 -2.6 -29.7 (1976) 
Spain 80.0 73.2 79.1 -6.8 
 
16.3 15.6 17.5 -0.8 -16.6 (1980) 
Portugal 94.0 80.0 67.0 -14.0 
 
25.4 19.3 20.5 -6.0 -64.8 (1980) 
Greece 65.0 65.0 40.0 0.0 
 
31.3 25.4 21.3 -5.9 -34.9 (1980) 
           
France 90.0 92.0 98.0 2.0 
 
7.90 7.90 7.70 -0.9 -64.4 (1969) 
Luxembourg 60.0 58.0 59.0 -2.0 
 
43.5 37.0 32.8 -6.5 -20.9 (1970) 
Australia 70.0 45.0 61.0 -25.0 
 
32.1 18.0 17.0 -14.1 -64.1 (1976) 
Ireland 40.0 42.2 32.4 2.2 
 
48.1 33.5 29.6 -14.6 -42.8 (1978) 
           
UK 36.0 30.8 29.5 -5.2 
 
33.1 26.5 25.4 -6.6 -47.7 (1978) 
Canada 36.7 31.6 29.0 -5.1 
 
33.7 27.4 27.2 -6.3 -16.4 (1984) 
Japan 21.5 16.0 19.6 -5.5 
 
24.4 18.4 17.8 -6.0 -48.2 (1964) 
New Zealand 43.3 17.0 15.0 -26.3 
 
27.2 20.8 19.4 -6.4 -69.9 (1980) 
USA 16.7 13.1 11.9 -3.6   14.3 11.4 10.8 -2.9 -63.1 (1960) 
 Sources: ICTWSS Database 2013; Schnabel (2013); Pontusson (2013); OECD.stat 
aFigures in italics indicate corresponding values for 2013  
bPeak year given in parentheses 
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Source: Author’s calculations 
a 
The reported sample probabilities are based on the annual IAB Establishment Panel (IAB-
Betriebspanel), 2005-2013, unweighted data  
b 
Questions on pact status are asked in the 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2013 waves of the IAB 
Establishment Panel 
c 
Questions on opening clause status are asked in the 2005, 2007, and 2011 waves of the IAB 
Establishment Panel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
